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ABSTRACT 
Farnoosh Khodakarami: Essays on Relationship Marketing  
(Under the direction of Rajdeep Grewal and J. Andrew Petersen) 
 
Relationship marketing (RM) is defined as “all marketing activities directed towards 
establishing, developing, and maintaining successful relational exchanges” (Morgan and Hunt 
1994, p. 22). Firms invest in RM activities to develop and maintain relationship with customers. 
Relationship marketing is not new to marketing literature. However, investigations report mixed 
results regarding the effectiveness of relationship marketing (Palmatier et al. 2006. Palmatier 
2008). There is still need for research to guide managers on how to develop and maintain 
relationship with customers; which customers are better target for relationship marketing 
initiatives; how customer’s relationship with an organization evolve over time and when 
relationship marketing is more effective to enhance customer behavior. Specifically, research in 
relationship marketing is often studied within the frame of a single firm, due to data limitation. 
There has yet to be much research that sheds light on how customers build and maintain 
relationship with multiple firms in a competitive environment. In this dissertation, I aim to 
answer these questions with two studies. 
In the first study of this dissertation, in a non-profit context, I study the drivers of relationship 
over a customer (in this case a donor) relationship with an organization. I also examine how 
breadth of the relationship a donor builds with the non-profit affects donor’s behavior over time. 
In addition, I conduct a field study to examine whether marketing communications can help to 
increase the breadth of relationship donors build with the organization. In the second study of 
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this dissertation, I focus on reward program, which is a widely used relationship marketing 
strategy across industries.  I examine a customer’s usage of loyalty programs across competing 
firms, to see how a customer’s relationship with one firm and redeeming a reward at this firm 
impacts that customer’s future search and transaction behavior at the focal firm as well as with 
competing firms. I also investigate the impact of redeeming a reward on heavy users and light 
users to see if reward programs induce different responses from loyal customers vs. less engaged, 
infrequent customers.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms rely on relationship marketing (RM) practices to develop and maintain relationship 
with their customers, with the goal of enhancing performance (Palmatier 2008). However, past 
research shows mixed results for impacts of relationship marketing on performance outcomes 
(e.g. Colgate and Danaher 2000 ; Palmatier et al. 2006; Srinivasan and Moorman 2005) . 
Specifically with regard to loyalty programs that are commonly used to enhance customers’ 
relationship with the firm, there is still ambiguity on whether these programs can successfully 
increase behavior loyalty (Dowling and Uncles 1997; Leenheer et al. 2007). 
A majority of studies on relationship marketing focus on antecedents of relationship between 
a firm and its customers. Studies have explored the role of trust, commitment, satisfaction and 
other motivating factors that affect the strength and duration of relationship (e.g. Ganesan 1994; 
Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992; Palmatier et al. 2006; Sirdeshmukh, Singh, and  Sabol 
2002). However, an import issue that requires more in-depth investigation is the dynamic nature 
of customer-firm relationship over an extend period of time. For instance, it is important for 
managers to know at which stage (acquisition vs. retention) RM initiatives are more effective. 
Past research suggests that relationship marketing effort should be targeted at customers who are 
more responsive to relationship marketing (Palmatier et al. 2006). However, it is not clear that 
which customers are more responsive to RM initiative, or whether customers’ responsiveness to 
RM initiatives changes over the customer life cycle. Furthermore, research in relationship 
marketing is often studied within the frame of a single firm, due to data limitation. However, in 
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many industries it is common that customers transact with multiple competing firms. Thus, in 
order to investigate the impact of RM practices of a firm on customer behavior one needs to 
consider a customer’s interactions across all firms, and whether these RM practices have cross-
firm effects on customer behavior (Leenheer et al. 2007; Liu and Yang 2009). 
In my dissertation, I aim to tackle these aspects of relationship marketing that has not been 
thoroughly investigated. More specifically, I aim to answer the following research questions: 
What are the drivers of relationship with an organization?  
How do relationships with an organization evolve over the customers’ life cycle? 
How do customers’ relationships with multiple organizations evolve over time?  
In the first essay, I answer the first two questions. Within a non-profit context, I examine 
whether the breadth of relationship impact performance outcomes, and whether the drivers of 
relationship change over time. For this study, I use the donor database of a major public 
university foundation. I empirically test if donors who build a broader relationship with the 
nonprofit are more valuable to the organization over time. I show that breadth of relationship has 
significant impact on donor behavior. Donors with broader relationship are more likely to give 
again in the next fiscal year and conditional on a gift occurring, expected value of the gift is 
larger. Further, these donors are more responsive to the organization’s marketing 
communications. I also show that drivers of relationship change over time.  I find in general that 
donor characteristics are more influential in driving the breadth of the relationship at the 
acquisition stage. However, as the donor-nonprofit relationship develops over time, marketing 
efforts from the nonprofit organization become more influential. 
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Knowing that donors who have broader relationship with the organization are more valuable, 
I conduct a field study to show that relationship marketing communications help to increase the 
breadth of relationship donors build with the organization. 
In the second essay, I answer the third question and explore customers’ relationships with 
multiple organizations. Customers usually are not 100% loyal to one firm and purchase across 
firms.  Many firms offer loyalty programs, to reward their best customers and enhance the 
relationship with those customers. However, customers are members of and influenced by 
loyalty programs across many different firms. In essay 2, I investigate how a customer’s reward 
redemption at a firm impacts that customer’s future search and transaction behavior at that firm 
as well as with competing firms.  To do this, I use a novel dataset from a mobile advertising and 
loyalty app provider which partners with multiple firms and allows customers to manage 
relationships with independent loyalty programs across those different firms. I match customers 
based on their probability of redeeming a reward at the focal store and find that customers who 
redeem a reward will visit the store more often and spend more on average, as compared to those 
customers who have accumulated the same amount of points, but did not redeem any reward.  
Interestingly, customers who redeemed a reward will also become more interested in competitive 
offerings, and will visit other stores more often as compared to non-redeemers. These findings 
suggest that redeeming a reward has positive effect on customer behavior at the focal store, but 
also makes them more prone to look for other offers once they utilize the points they have 
accumulated at that store. In other words, this study reveals that there is a spillover effect in a 
customer’s behavior across loyalty programs across firms. This has significant implication to 
theory. It is impossible to demonstrate the cross-firm effect of reward redemption without 
observing a customer’s relationships with multiple firms. Furthermore, analysis of redeemers’ 
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post-redemption behavior reveals that redeeming a reward has much more positive effect on light 
users as compared to heavy users. This result shows that relationship marketing practices that are 
targeted at light users have higher return on investment for firm.  
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CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPING DONOR RELATIONSHIPS: THE ROLE OF THE 
BREADTH OF RELATIONSHIP
1
 
 
Abstract 
This research proposes a mechanism to develop long term donor relationships, a major 
challenge in the nonprofit industry. We propose a metric, Donation Variety, which captures both 
the depth and breadth of donations a donor has with a given nonprofit organization. Using 
donation data spanning twenty years from a major US public university, we find that 
improvements in Donation Variety increases the likelihood the donor makes a subsequent 
donation along with the donation amount and reduces the sensitivity of donations to negative 
macroeconomic shocks. In the acquisition phase, most donors give to a single initiative and that 
these decisions are influenced more by a donor’s intrinsic motivations. In contrast, as the donor-
nonprofit organization relationship develops over time, nonprofit marketing efforts have a more 
significant influence on a donor’s decision to give to multiple initiatives. Finally, we conduct a 
field study that validates the econometric analysis and provides causal evidence that marketing 
efforts by nonprofit organizations can encourage donors to spread donations across multiple 
initiatives. 
Keywords: Donation Variety, Field Study, Cross-buying, Donor Relationship Management 
                                                     
1
 This chapter previously appeared as an article in the Journal of Marketing. The original citation is as 
follows: Khodakarami, Farnoosh, J. Andrew Petersen, and Rajkumar Venkatesan,” Developing Donor 
Relationships: The Role of the Breadth of Giving,” Journal of Marketing 79, no. 4 (July 2015): 77. 
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Introduction  
From 1999 to 2009 there has been a 59% growth in the number of public charities and a 54% 
growth in the number of foundations in the US. However, the growth of donations has been 
relatively slow. Adjusting for inflation, private charitable giving remained steady at $290.89B 
between 2000 and 2010.
2
 With decreasing government support and the slow growth of 
donations, competition for scarce resources among nonprofit organizations has become intense 
(Foster and Meinhard 2002; Sargeant and Woodliffe 2007; Thornton 2006). Nonprofits have to 
spend substantial resources in donor acquisition activities, with about half of the newly acquired 
donors lost after the first donation (Magson 1999; Masters 2000; Sargeant and Woodliffe 2007). 
For instance, in the higher education sector, the retention rate for first time donors has been 
below 30% in 2012 and 2013.
3
 Thus, building long-term relationships with donors becomes 
critical for nonprofits. To combat this challenge, many nonprofits now keep donor-level 
information that can be leveraged for donor selection and optimal resource allocation (Kumar 
and Petersen 2005; Lemon, White, and Winer 2002).  
This raises an interesting question about whether strategies to manage customer relationships 
in the for-profit sector can be easily translated as strategies to manage donors in the nonprofit 
sector. While the data collection process is similar (i.e. recording transactions, marketing efforts, 
and customer/donor characteristics), the motivations of donors to give varies significantly from 
the motivations of customers to purchase (Ariely and Norton 2009). However, there are not been 
                                                     
2
 National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) data, available at: 
http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/index.cfm 
 
3
 https://www.blackbaud.com/nonprofit-resources/highered-fundraising-index 
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much research into repeat giving behavior by donors to nonprofit organizations. Thus, it is 
important to understand how acquisition and retention strategies impact sustained giving.  
An approach observed specifically in the non-profit industry to motivate sustained giving is 
to give donors control over how their gift is utilized by the nonprofit. In fact, many nonprofit 
organizations now offer multiple causes, initiatives, or areas where donations can be directed. 
The American Red Cross and UNESCO have been using this strategy for a while, and many 
companies now run cause-related marketing campaigns with multiple causes from which donors 
can choose. Providing donors with the opportunity to direct their gift toward specific causes or 
fundraising projects is driven by management beliefs that such options can help increase 
donation intentions and donor retention. Anecdotal evidence seems to corroborate this belief. 
Survey studies show that consumers have greater interest in participating in cause-related 
campaigns that allow donors to choose a charity they want to support.
4
 Lab experiments also 
show that targeting donations has a positive effect on gift amount (Li et al. 2013; Robinson, 
Irmak, and Jayachandran 2012). However, there is no research which explores the drivers and 
consequences of a donor’s decision to support multiple initiatives at a nonprofit organization. 
We focus on this phenomenon of giving to multiple initiatives in our research and 
empirically test if donors who support multiple initiatives of a nonprofit organization are in fact 
more valuable over time. We measure the depth and breadth of giving by a donor using a single 
individual- and time-varying metric we call Donation Variety. We define Donation Variety as 
the weighted sum of the share of each initiative a donor supports, where the weight for each 
initiative is the logarithm of the share (similar to the measurement of entropy).  
                                                     
4
 For instance, 73% of respondents in survey said that they would be more likely to participate in a cause 
marketing program if they were allowed to choose which charity is selected in-store. Source: 
http://www.dowelldogood.net/ 
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Our research has three main research questions. In the first study, we focus on answering the 
first two research questions. In order to answer these first two research questions, we analyze 
twenty years of donation history of a nonprofit organization. To start, we want to better 
understand what motivates donors to increase the depth and breadth of their support of a 
nonprofit organization (i.e. increase Donation Variety). We expect that the factors which drive 
Donation Variety are likely to change over the course of the donor’s relationship with the 
nonprofit organization (from acquisition through retention). Thus, our first research question is: 
1. What factors motivate donors to increase the depth and breadth (Donation Variety) of 
their support of a nonprofit at different stages of their relationship life cycle? 
 
We find in general that a donor’s ties to the nonprofit are more influential in driving 
Donation Variety at the acquisition stage. However, as the donor-nonprofit relationship develops 
over time (during the retention phase), marketing efforts from the nonprofit organization become 
more influential at driving Donation Variety. In the second part of the first study, we want to 
understand the impact that Donation Variety has on a donor’s future giving behavior. 
Specifically, our goal is to empirically test, after controlling for the other key drivers of giving 
behavior, how the distribution of past gifts among multiple causes (Donation Variety) affects the 
future giving behavior of a donor. Thus, our second research question is:  
2. What is the effect of the depth and breadth of past gifts (Donation Variety) to a nonprofit 
on future donor giving behavior? 
 
We find that after we control for marketing efforts, donor’s ties to the nonprofit, and amount 
of past gifts, the higher the Donation Variety of the past donations: (1) the more likely the donor 
will give again in the next fiscal year, and (2) conditional on a gift occurring, the larger the 
expected value of the gift. Further, we find empirical evidence that Donation Variety also lowers 
a donor’s responsiveness to declining macroeconomic conditions. 
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In the second study, we further explore the causal relationship between marketing actions and 
Donation Variety through a field study with the focal nonprofit organization. The goal is to 
understand how changes in the marketing communications by the nonprofit organization can 
induce different levels of Donation Variety. Through this field study we aim to answer our third 
research question: 
3. Can nonprofit organizations use targeted marketing efforts to encourage donors to 
increase their Donation Variety? 
 
We find through our field study that marketing communications that encourage donating to 
an additional initiative were able to significantly increase the probability of a donor giving again 
in the future and, conditional on the gift, giving more in total. Further, we found that when 
donors who already give to multiple initiatives (n = x) are encouraged to give to another 
initiative (n = x+1), these donors were just as likely to give again as donors in the control group, 
but the total amount of giving was higher. 
We believe that the results of our study provide several key contributions to the nonprofit and 
marketing literature and practice. Targeted (or directed) giving (i.e. allowing donors to target 
their gift to specific causes) has recently received some attention in the literature. However, there 
is need for more research in this area. A review of studies (see Appendix 2.A) shows that most of 
studies focus on the effectiveness of targeted giving focus on whether giving donors the choice 
to direct gift affects giving behavior. These studies are mostly in an experimental setting or a 
small-scale field study. In such settings, choice of causes is limited and the long-term impacts of 
targeted giving have not been investigated. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first 
study in the area of targeted giving that uses donation data at the individual donor level to 
investigate targeted giving behavior over long-run. Unlike previous studies, we do not focus on 
whether targeted giving is effective. We consider what motivates donors when they are given the 
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choice of multiple causes to direct their gifts and how this decision to spread gift across causes 
affects the donor’s future giving to that nonprofit. We also take advantage of field study to 
provide causal evidence that marketing efforts by nonprofit organizations can encourage donors 
to give to multiple causes and give more to the nonprofit.   
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss theoretical foundation and 
hypotheses and define Donation Variety and illustrate its measurement. Then, we empirically test 
what factors drive donors to increase Donation Variety and the consequences of Donation 
Variety of past gifts on future giving behavior. Next, we describe and provide results of a field 
study we ran with the focal nonprofit organization. Finally, we discuss the implications along the 
limitations and opportunities for further research.  
Study 1: Drivers and Consequences of Donation Variety 
 
From an exchange process perspective, the ongoing relationship process between the 
nonprofit organization and the donor follows steps similar in nature to the firm-customer 
exchange process outlined by Gupta and Zeithaml (2006). First, the nonprofit organization 
communicates with potential donors to acquire them through various marketing efforts. Second, 
the potential donors make a set of simultaneous decisions on: (1) whether to donate and 
conditional on donating, (2) how much to donate, and (3) how to allocate the donation to 
different initiatives. A donor’s decision on whether to give, how much to give, and to which 
donation options to allocate the gift is affected by the donor’s ties to the nonprofit (i.e. personal 
experience, level of identification with and interest in different donation options), donor’s 
characteristics, and the nonprofit-initiated marketing efforts. After the nonprofit receives the 
donations in the given time period, the nonprofit-donor exchange process then repeats 
dynamically over time as the relationship between the two continues to develop. 
12 
 
Nonprofits that offer multiple donation options hope that this strategy increases donation 
intentions and donor retention. Giving choices to donors increase a donor’s perception of having 
a personal role in helping a nonprofit organization. This facilitates development of role identity 
by creating a sense of “self-determination” and “ownership,” and allows donors to contribute in 
personally meaningful ways (Grant 2012).  In experimental settings, giving donors control to 
choose between multiple programs offered by a charity increased both donation amount and 
purchase intention for the associated products (Null 2011; Robinson, Irmak, and Jayachandran 
2012). Despite the prevalence of multiple-cause donation, there is little empirical research on 
whether giving to multiple causes increases the donor’s repeat giving behavior to the nonprofit 
and what factors may motivate a donor to distribute her gift across multiple causes (Bennett 
2012; Ly and Mason 2012).   
Literature on variety in consumption of goods and services suggest that a consumer may seek 
variety because of satiation with current options or need for novelty (Kahn 1995; McAlister and 
Pessemier 1982). However, when a donor makes a gift, she sacrifices her own “physical 
consumption” to get satisfaction from trading off “positive physical consumption” for “positive 
conceptual consumption” (Ariely and Norton 2009). This suggests that the process of giving to 
charities is conceptually different than that of consuming goods or services and what motivate 
donors to support multiple causes might be different from what motivate variety seeking in 
consumption. The literature on variety seeking also does little help to hypothesize the effect of 
supporting multiple causes on a donor’s giving behavior to a nonprofit.  Therefore, we draw on 
the literature on tie-strength (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1996) and social capital theory (Coleman 
1988; Putnam 1995) to hypothesize the factors that explain drivers and consequences of giving to 
multiple causes.  
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Hypothesis Development  
 
 Drivers of Donation Variety. First, we would like to explore what factors influence a donor’s 
decision to support multiple causes of a nonprofit. Similar to customer-firm relationship, both 
internal and external motivators may impact a donor-nonprofit relationship.  Individual are 
intrinsically motivated when they get inherent satisfaction and enjoyment from their act. Intrinsic 
motivators are thus “an endogenous part of a person’s engagement in the activity". Extrinsic 
motivations on the other hand come from an outside source and encourage individual to obtain a 
desired outcome (Amabile 1993; Ryan and Deci 2000). A donor’s engagement with a nonprofit 
may internally drive the donor’s decision to support multiple causes of the nonprofit. For 
instance, a donor who has personal interest and experience with different causes may feel more 
broadly tied to the nonprofit than a donor who is mainly interested in fewer causes and focuses 
her support on those causes. In addition, nonprofit-initiated marketing efforts are an external 
motivator for a donor to support multiple causes. Given that the context of charitable giving is 
highly relationship-based, we investigate how these two key factors (intrinsic vs. extrinsic) affect 
donation variety in two stages of a donor’s life cycle (acquisition vs. retention). 
Intrinsic Motivators. Individuals may engage in an activity because of an inherent desire.  
Donors often prefer to give to charities that they can inherently relate to. Personal experience 
with a charity, whether a donor has benefited from a cause in the past or believes that will benefit 
from it, motivates giving to that charity (Ariely and Norton 2009; Bennett 2010; Bekkers and 
Wiepking 2007; Null 2011; Robinson, Irmak, and Jayachandran 2012). Research on philanthropy 
also shows that many people prefer to support those who are similar to themselves and help 
charities that are congruent with their identification (Bennett 2012; Sargeant and Woodliffe 
2007). Identification in this context refers to the extent to which donors feel connected with a 
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specific cause and how those causes align with internal fit (i.e. causes that are closer to their 
heart) (Aaker and Akutsu 2009; Sirgy 1982). Thus, a donor who has a personal experience or 
identifies with multiple causes of the nonprofit is more likely to support multiple causes.  
When a donor makes her first gift to a nonprofit organization, she may have limited knowledge 
about the various donation options offered by the organization. In addition, at the early stage of 
relationship, individuals have less confidence in their evaluation of an organization’s offerings 
and might feel uncertain about the way in which the nonprofit provides value to the recipients of 
various causes (Bolton 1998; Swann and Gill 1997; Verhoef, Franses, and Hoekstra 2002). Thus, 
at the initial stage of relationship (acquisition), donors are more likely to make donation choices 
based on their personal experiences with specific causes and degree of identification with a cause 
(internal motivators). And, a donor who can relate to multiple causes initially is more likely to 
give to multiple causes for her first donation compared to a donor who is initially tied only to a 
single or few causes. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1: The positive effect of a donor’s intrinsic motivators on Donation Variety is stronger in 
the acquisition phase than the retention phase. 
Extrinsic Motivators. Individuals may engage in an act because of an external source that 
motivates them to obtain a desired outcome. Donors may be driven to donate by external 
motivators, in this case ongoing marketing communications between the foundation and the 
donor. Like customer loyalty, donor loyalty requires appropriate communication and a 
relationship-building strategy. If donors are “neglected and not asked for a second gift,” their 
contributions might decrease or even stop after a first donation (Andreoni 2006; Bekkers and 
Wiepking 2007; Sargeant 2001). Nonprofits that give feedback to donors by expressing 
appreciation and/or by responding to donor concerns can impact a donor’s attitudes toward the 
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organization and their willingness to engage in repeat giving (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007; 
Kottasz 2004; Sargeant 2001).  
Marketing efforts such as loyalty programs and direct mails have positive effect on cross-buying 
of additional products and services (Kumar, George, and Pancras 2008; George, Kumar, and 
Grewal 2013; Verhoef, Franses, and Hoekstra 2001; Li, Sun, and Montgomery 2011). Likewise, 
nonprofits can leverage targeted marketing techniques to develop more relationship with donors, 
provide information about organization’s various causes and programs, and introduce donors to 
new donation opportunities. Further, as the donor-nonprofit relationship grows over time, the 
donor develops more trust toward the nonprofit and its ability to provide value to the recipient of 
donation. This trust influences them to give to more causes they are aware of from marketing 
communications even if they don’t have prior ties with the causes.  As a result, we expect that 
over time, the donor becomes more receptive to the nonprofit’s communications and solicitation 
requests to support additional causes (Celsi and Olson 1988). Thus, we hypothesize:  
H2: The positive effect of extrinsic motivators on Donation Variety is stronger in the 
retention phase than the acquisition phase. 
Consequences of Donation Variety. Main effect of Donation Variety: Charitable 
organizations can often enhance donation intentions by granting donors choices for which causes 
they wish to support. Donors who support multiple initiatives build a more extended network 
with the nonprofit organization. In commercial context, social capital, measured as the strength 
of the buyer-seller tie, has significant positive impact on purchase behavior (Frenzen and Davis 
1990).  Social capital theory posits that a donor who is connected to multiple causes of a 
nonprofit has stronger social ties to the nonprofit through her multiple connections (Putnam 
1995). Stronger ties to the nonprofit through involvement with multiple causes of a nonprofit can 
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reinforce a donor’s contribution to the nonprofit (Apinunmahakul and Devlie 2008; Brooks 
2005; McAdam and Paulsen 1993, Brown and Ferris 2007). In addition, people with more 
diverse and extended social networks are more exposed to donation and volunteering 
solicitations and may have lower cost of giving (Brown and Ferris 2007; Uzzi 1999). As a result, 
a donor with more extended network with a nonprofit may gain higher perceived utility from her 
gift to the nonprofit, and in turn she is expected to make more donations in future. Thus, we 
expect the incremental benefits from a more extended donor-nonprofit network to be more 
valuable than the gain from a donor-nonprofit relationship that focuses on fewer causes.  
In addition, giving repeatedly to a single initiative might lead to a decrease in marginal warm-
glow utility derived from the act of giving. This in turn decreases a donor’s willingness to give in 
the future (Andreoni 1990). In an experimental study, Null (2011) show that warm glow utility 
of giving can lead to “a love of variety” among charities.  In her experiment, most participants 
give simultaneously to multiple charities even when charities are similar in mission, and even 
when the benefits of the gift to the recipient were set at different levels by varying matching rate. 
We expect that giving to a variety of causes increase the marginal utility and total satisfaction a 
donor experiences from giving to a nonprofit organization. Satisfaction and positive evaluation 
of an experience leads to repeated engagement with that experience (Bennett 2012; Grant 2012). 
We argue that after controlling for a donor’s amount of past gift and a donor’s capability of 
giving, donors who have previously distributed their gift across more donation options (i.e. 
higher Donation Variety) will give more in future. Thus, we hypothesize:   
H3: All else being equal, individuals who have higher Donation Variety are expected to give 
more in the future than individuals with a lower Donation Variety. 
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Moderating effect of Donation Variety on economic shocks. Economic shocks have a significant 
impact on a donor’s ability and desire to make a donation. As the economic condition declines 
and purchasing power decreases across all individuals, people start to cut down on unnecessary 
costs. For instance, during the recent economic downturn in the US, the percentage of consumers 
involved in a nonprofit cause dropped from 60 to 53 percent within two years.
5
  The 
uncertainties of economic shocks have a significant impact on a nonprofit’s ability to predict 
future donor value. During an economic downturn the cost of giving increases, and all donors 
face a declining budget requiring some costs to be cut. In such situations, donors with weak ties 
to the nonprofit may be more willing to cut their support to a charity that they do not feel 
strongly tied to. However, donors with strong ties to the nonprofit may be more willing to 
tradeoff on some of their other costs to keep up with support. Donors with strong tie the 
nonprofit have internalized a donor role into their identity and feel more committed to sustain 
their support even when economic conditions decline (Brown and Ferris 2007; Seargant and 
Woodliffe 2007). Thus, we hypothesize:  
H4: As the macroeconomic climate declines, individuals with a higher Donation Variety will 
respond less negatively than donors with a lower Donation Variety. 
Data 
 
Context. We chose a university foundation as the context to empirically test our hypotheses. 
Donations to educational organizations are of great importance. In the United States, education 
organizations receive the second-largest share of all charitable contributions.
6
 Higher educational 
                                                     
5
 http://www.causemarketingforum.com 
 
6
 http://www.givingusareports.org 
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organizations are greatly dependent on contributions of alumni donors. Further, the ability to 
acquire and retain alumni donors is a major challenge for higher educational organizations. 
Despite the economic growth after the great economic recession, the declining acquisition rate of 
new alumni donors is a threat for survival of higher education organizations. Another major 
challenge for educational institutions is a low retention rate, especially since the majority of 
donors are lost after their first gift.
7
 Thus, understanding a donor’s behavior and motivations for 
sustained support is of great importance for educational organizations.  
Further, educational foundations allow donors to give to multiple units. Within a college or 
university, donors can choose to either generally donate to an unrestricted fund to be used at the 
foundation’s discretion, or the donor can choose to make a donation which is targeted to specific 
departments, associations, scholarships, memorials, etc. To motivate our econometric model, we 
run an exploratory analysis on the donation data of a major public university foundation to see 
whether there is a difference between the ongoing giving behaviors of donors who give to one 
initiative versus those who give to multiple initiatives.  
For our analysis, we use the donor database of a major public university foundation. The 
focal university has 44 specific departments and associations where donors can direct their 
donations, including, but not limited to, funds for specific colleges, schools, groups, 
scholarships, memorials, as well as a general unrestricted fund. We focus only on donors from 
the annual giving program and exclude donors involved in or targeted for major planned and 
capital gifts. Planned gifts and capital gifts are one time large gifts that are often at or near the 
end of the relationship (e.g. bequests) or dedicated to special projects (e.g. scholarships, 
                                                     
7
 Annual Report on Higher Education Alumni Giving, 2013. Source: 
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buildings). These major gifts are only made by a small segment of donors. On the other hand, the 
majority of donors participate in the annual giving program. Annual gifts are smaller gifts that 
require yearly decision-making by donors. We believe these recurring gifts offer a good 
representation of the ongoing relationship between most donors and nonprofit organizations. 
Sampling. We use a stratified random sample of 500 donors in the annual giving program 
that made their first gift in each of the years between fiscal year (FY)
8
 1993 and FY 2003 and 
record each individual’s characteristics and donation behavior aggregated at the annual level 
through the end of FY 2012. This gives us a sample of 5,500 donors (500 for each year) with an 
average of 15 years of data for each donor. In our dataset, each donation is on average around 
$381, the total donations per donor over the observation window are about $2,391, and the total 
number of gifts in the observation window is about 11.2 per donor. 96% of donors made their 
initial donation to a single initiative leaving only about 4% who donated to more than one 
initiative in the first year. By the end of FY 2012, 67% of donors gave to multiple initiatives. 
This means after the initial gift, a majority of donors gave to new initiatives in a subsequent year. 
Variable Operationalization 
 
Donation Variety. The key variable we use in our model is Donation Variety. We propose 
that, in addition to the number of different initiatives an individual donates to, it is important to 
measure the strength of the ties a donor builds with a nonprofit through supporting multiple 
initiatives. Therefore, we introduce the variable Donation Variety to differentiate various 
donation patterns. Here, we define the Donation Variety for a given donor as the weighted sum 
                                                     
8
 Fiscal Year (FY) for this nonprofit organization starts on July 1
st
 and ends on June 30
th
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of the share of each initiative a donor supports, where the weight for each initiative is the 
logarithm of its share. Thus, Donation Variety can be represented as: 
                                        
it
VarietyDonation                                           (1) 
At a given point in time t for donor i, Sijt is the share of the total donation donor i made to 
initiative j until time t  relative to the total donation donor i made to the nonprofit organization 
until that time. For a donor who gives exclusively to a single initiative, Donation Variety is 0. 
The Donation Variety increases as a donor gives to more initiatives and gives evenly across 
many different initiatives. Donation variety is a cumulative measure of giving behavior that takes 
into account both the number of initiatives an individual selects for donation and the relative 
importance of each initiative in the total amount of donation. This measure gets updated every 
time a donor makes a new donation to reflect the change in the giving portfolio.  
The Donation Variety index is similar to the entropy measure that is used to measure the 
level of diversity in a company’s business portfolio as well as in an individual’s investment 
portfolio (e.g. Chatterjee, and Blocher 1992; Hoskisson, et al. 1993; Palepu 1985; Palich, 
Cardinal, and  Miller 2000; Woerheide and Persson 1993). Entropy measure has also been 
applied by marketing scholars to model customer brand preferences using market share of 
various brands (Herniter 1976; Kapur, Bector, and Kumar 1984).  Similarly, Simonson and 
Winer (1992) applied a variety score based on the overall share of items purchased by household 
to account for choice variety. The authors also used the sum of the squares of the brands' shares 
to measure “taste concentration” (homogeneity) in a household’s purchase portfolio. Further, 
Kahn (1995) recommends the use of entropy measure to account for variety in a consumer’s 
purchase portfolio. Kahn (1995) argues that: “even if the number of items included in the choice 
set is constant, there is more variety in the choice history if the choice shares of the items 


m
1j
ijtijt SlnS
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included are equal (maximum entropy) than if one alternative dominates (low entropy).” Thus, 
we apply a similar measure to measure the depth and breadth of a donor’s giving to multiple 
donation options. We argue that, compared to other possible measures such as average donation 
per initiative or number of initiatives chosen for donation, Donation Variety is a more 
informative measure of how donors distribute their donations across multiple initiatives. 
Intrinsic Motivators. To test H1 we need a variable (or set of variables) which represents the 
extent to which a donor has an intrinsic motivation to donate to multiple initiatives. We expect 
that a donor’s strength of ties to various initiatives of a nonprofit can act as a good indicator of a 
stronger tie and broad connectedness to the university. Sharing demographic characteristics has 
been shown as a good proxy for measuring the strength of a tie between two individuals 
(Reagans 2005). Thus, we expect that variables which describe cases where alumni likely have 
multiple connections with different initiatives/departments of a university are good indicators of 
stronger and broader intrinsic ties to the university. Thus, we use two variables as indicators of 
the strength and breadth of ties across different initiatives/departments: (1) the number of 
degrees the alumnus has with the university, and (2) having a spouse that also graduated from the 
university. We expect that these two variables are likely indicators of alumni that have had or 
shared broader experiences across the university. For example, donors with multiple degrees 
have often had different experiences across programs (e.g. Bachelors, Masters, PhD) or across 
schools (e.g. Arts & Sciences, Business, Medicine, Engineering, Law, etc.). We find that the 
alumni of the university have on average about 1.2 degrees from the university and about 30% 
are married to other alumni from the university.  
Extrinsic Motivators. To test H2 we need a variable (or set of variables) which represents the 
extent to which a donor has an extrinsic motivation to donate to multiple initiatives. Much of the 
22 
 
external motivation for alumni to make donations comes from the marketing efforts which are 
initiated by the university foundation. These marketing efforts initiated by the university 
foundation include personal visits, phonathon calls, invitations to events, and direct mail/email 
solicitations. We expect that different types of marketing efforts are likely to have varying 
impacts on a donor’s decision to make a gift. For reasons of parsimony, we choose to group 
phonathon calls and direct mail/email as impersonal marketing efforts, since the message content 
used for these marketing efforts is homogenous across the donor population and less interactive. 
Further, we group personal visits and invitations to events as personal marketing efforts, since 
their content and experience is richer and more donor-specific (Venkatesan and Kumar 2004).  
In our sample, on average, alumni receive about five times as many impersonal (0.49) vs. 
personal (0.09) marketing communications from the university per year. This is common, given 
the much higher cost of personal marketing communications. We note that the focal educational 
foundation follows a similar process when initiating any type of marketing communications to 
alumni. All alumni generally receive a communication from both the university and the general 
alumni association starting just prior to graduation. All communications, including informational 
newsletters, contain an appeal letter asking for a gift. These communications generally continue 
for several years post-graduation, regardless of whether a gift is given. When an initial gift is 
given, the alumnus can choose whether the gift is given to a specific initiative, multiple 
initiatives, or to an unrestricted fund.
9
 Once a gift is given, the initiative(s) supported often 
communicate regularly with the donor in the future asking for subsequent gifts to the same 
initiative(s) which were previously supported. 
                                                     
9
 We note that an unrestricted gift is also an initiative a donor can give to, just like a gift to a specific 
department. 
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Gift Giving Behavior. To test H3 we need a variable which represents the outcome of the gift 
giving process. In this case, since we aggregate the data on an annual basis by fiscal year, we 
define gift giving as the total amount of donations by a given donor in a given year. We find that 
conditional on giving, the average gift amount is about $381. We also control for the recency 
effect of gift giving by including lag of donation amount in our analysis.  
Macroeconomic Condition. To test H4 we need a variable which represents the 
macroeconomic conditions that the alumni are facing. Similar to many other studies in 
marketing, we measure the overall macroeconomic condition as the cyclical component of GDP 
data after we apply a HP-filter (Hodrick and Prescott 1997) to remove the long-term trend 
component of GDP. Thus, the average macroeconomic condition in the sample is 0 and any 
deviation above (below) 0 suggests a positive (negative) macroeconomic climate. 
Control Variables. In addition we include several control variables in our model. We include 
variables that try to capture the financial strength or capacity of giving of a given alumnus. First, 
we include the average household income and average charitable contribution at the zip-code 
level based on the donor’s residence. Second, we include time since graduation since the longer 
it has been since an alumnus graduated, the higher the likelihood that their earning power and 
assets are higher. Finally, we control for the amount of the previous gift. We also include some 
demographic variables to account for observed heterogeneity. These include gender and location 
(in-state vs. out-of-state). We provide a list of the variables, descriptive statistics, and description 
of the operationalization of each variable in Table 2.1 (See Table 2.1) 
Model Development 
 
Model Free Evidence. For the first step of our model development we run an exploratory 
analysis to provide some model free evidence of how donation variety might be related to donor 
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value. We use the same sample of 5,500 donors in the annual giving program of a public 
university which made their initial gift to a single initiative between fiscal year (FY) 1993 and 
FY 2003. We split the sample into two groups: (1) donors who began at some point to give to 
multiple initiatives (n = 3,720), and (2) donors that only give to a single initiative during the 
entire observation window (n = 1,780) through FY 2012. For the first group (labeled Multiple 
Initiatives), we split the data into the time period when the donors only gave to a single initiative 
and the time period after they began giving to multiple initiatives. We then determine the average 
gift amount for donors before ($149.34) and after ($500.16) giving to a second initiative. For the 
second group (labeled Single Initiative), we split the data into two time periods as well. Here, we 
treat the first five years as early gifts (as this is the average time that a donor in the first group 
waits before donating to multiple initiatives) and any time after five years as later gifts. We then 
determine the average gift amount for donors in the early ($114.03) and later ($194.20) time 
periods (See Figure 2.1).  
First, we see that in both cases the average gifts in the early time period are lower than the 
average gifts in the later time periods, suggesting that, over time, there is an increase in average 
giving for all donors. However, we see that the increase in average gift amount for donors who 
give to multiple initiatives is significantly larger than the increase for the single-initiative donors 
($270.65; p < 0.01). This provides some evidence that increases in Donation Variety lead to 
increases in giving amounts. However, it is also important to quantify the benefits of Donation 
Variety by controlling for as many other factors that may affect donations as possible. To do this 
we build an econometric model which can identify the antecedents and consequences of 
Donation Variety. 
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Endogeneity of Marketing. To empirically test our hypotheses, we must first control for the 
endogeneity of marketing efforts, since nonprofit organizations usually do not send solicitations 
at random. Nonprofit organizations commonly focus their fundraising efforts on donors and 
prospects that have a higher likelihood of donation or belong to specific demographic segments. 
To address the issue of endogeneity with marketing efforts, we use instrumental variables and 
estimate the instrumental variable model for both personal and impersonal marketing efforts and 
use a control function approach (Petrin and Train 2010) to include marketing efforts (both 
personal and impersonal) into the next step of analysis, along with the computed error from the 
instrumental variable equations. The detailed discussion on instrumental variable model and 
estimations is provided in Appendix 2.B (See Appendix 2.B) 
Methodology. In order to test hypotheses H1 and H2, we need a model that can help us 
understand what factors motivate a donor to increase donation variety over the donor's lifecycle. 
To accommodate both the acquisition and retention stages of donor relationship in the model, we 
use a binary variable (Firsti,t) to distinguish between initial and subsequent gifts, where Firsti,t = 1 
when it is the initial gift of donor i at time t, and Firsti,t = 0 when it is a subsequent donation by a 
given donor i. For Firsti,t = 1, the interaction of Firsti,t with donor intrinsic motivators and 
nonprofit-initiated marketing efforts help us to identify whether the impact of donors intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivators are strengthened or weakened across acquisition and retention stages.  
The focal variable of interest in this model is Donation Variety, as measured in Equation 1. 
Donation Variety is censored at 0 for donors who exclusively support a single initiative. Further, 
there is likely a high inertia in the measure of Donation Variety as it is measured as a cumulative 
index. To address the issue of the potential serial correlation of Donation Variety, we estimate a 
dynamic panel model with unobserved heterogeneity with Donation Variety as the dependent 
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variable. As noted, we do not observe a positive Donation Variety for all donors. In fact, most 
donors do not give to multiple initiatives in their initial gift (> 95% give to one initiative on their 
first gift), and some donors never actually give to multiple initiatives (about 33% never give to 
multiple initiatives). Therefore, our model needs to handle the partial observability of Donation 
Variety (i.e. it is censored at 0).  To do this we estimate the following panel data model:  
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Where Varietyi,t is the Donation Variety for donor i up to time t as computed from Equation 
1 (for t = 1, 2, …, T), Xit contains individual and time-varying explanatory variables such as 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivators, lagged donation amount, lagged donation variety, and first 
year dummy and its interaction with both intrinsic and extrinsic motivators;  ci and μi,t are 
individual-specific unobserved effect and normally distributed idiosyncratic error term. The 
limited dependent variable model is generally fitted using Tobit specification. One of the key 
limitations of Tobit specification is that the underlying process driving the probability of 
observing a positive value [P(Varietyi,t>0|Xit)] and the actual value [E(Varietyi,t )|Varietyi,t>0, 
Xit)] are both driven by the same underlying process. We adopt a general class of model 
specification proposed by Cragg (1971) that integrates the Probit and truncated normal models: 
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ti, . Unlike Tobit model specification, the Cragg model permits: 
(a) different explanatory variables for each decision, i.e. 𝑍 ≠ 𝑋; and (b) even when  𝑍 = 𝑋; the 
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underlying process driving the two decisions could be different, whereas in Tobit model 
𝛾 = 𝛽/𝛿.  Please note that Tobit model is a special form of Cragg model in which 𝑍 = 𝑋 and        
𝛾 = 𝛽/𝛿 . Thus, Cragg model is a more flexible alternative to Tobit model and it also has the 
benefit of enhanced efficiency due to the simultaneous estimation of both stages. We estimate 
the Cragg model specification using a maximum likelihood-based Craggit procedure in STATA 
13.1 (Burke 2009). We use clustered standard errors to account for autocorrelation and panel-
specific heteroskedasticity.   
Similarly, to test hypotheses H3 and H4 we need a model that can accommodate partial 
observability of the dependent variable, gift amount (i.e. we only observe a value for gift amount 
when a donation occurred). The model takes the following format:  
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where ln(Gifti,t) is the log of the gift amount given by donor i at time t (for t = 1, 2, …, T), 
and Xit contains individual and time-varying explanatory variables such as lagged donation 
amount, lagged donation variety, marketing efforts and donor’s intrinsic motivators;  ci and μi,t 
are individual-specific unobserved effect and normally distributed idiosyncratic error term. We 
use the same maximum likelihood-based Craggit procedure (Burke 2009) to estimate the model 
in equation (5).  
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Results  
 
The results of estimation for Equations 3 and 5 are presented in Table 2.2. Both models have 
good fit and majority of coefficients are statistically significant. However, interpretation of 
coefficients in the Cragg model can be precarious, as the effect of an independent variable can 
vary in magnitude as well as direction across the Probit model and the truncated normal 
regression. The problem of interpretation of coefficients associated with interaction effects in 
non-linear models is even more complicated (Ai and Norton 2003). Thus to empirically test the 
hypotheses, we calculate the unconditional expected value of the dependent variables (i.e. 
Donation Variety and donation amount) at each time t. We can then compare the mean of the 
predicted values across the different groups we want to test (See Table 2.2) 
To interpret the effect of intrinsic and extrinsic motivators on driving Donation Variety, we 
estimate the expected Donation Variety at different levels of intrinsic and extrinsic variables for 
both acquisition (first gift) and retention (repeat gift) stages of donor-nonprofit relationship. 
Estimations are presented in Figure 2a to 2d. Figure 2a and 2b present the interaction effect of 
intrinsic motivators and first donation indicator. These figures show that a donor’s multiple ties 
to the nonprofit are more influential on driving Donation Variety at the initial stage of the donor-
nonprofit relationship than the retention stage. For first gift, donors who have multiple degrees 
from the university (Figure 2a) and donors whose spouse are also university alumni (Figure 2b) 
are more likely to have a higher Donation Variety than donors who have fewer different ties to 
the university. However, we also notice that in the retention phase the donor’s intrinsic 
motivators have no additional effect on Donation Variety (See Figure 2.2a and 2.2b). 
Figure 2c and 2d present the interaction effect of marketing efforts and first donation 
indicator (See Figure 2.2c and 2.2d). These figures show that nonprofit marketing efforts are 
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more influential in driving Donation Variety at the retention stage than the acquisition stage. For 
first gift, marketing seems to play small role in encouraging donors to give to increase Donation 
Variety. However for repeat gifts, donors who receive more marketing efforts from the university 
foundation have higher expected Donation Variety on average as compared to donors who 
receive fewer marketing efforts. 
In order to estimate the direct and moderating effect of Donation Variety on gift amount, we 
predict the expected gift amount given different levels of Donation Variety. For donors who give 
to only one initiative, Donation Variety is 0 (no variety). For donors who give to multiple 
initiatives, we use median split to group them as donors with a low level of Donation Variety (0 
< Donation Variety < 0.64) and with a high level of Donation Variety (Donation Variety >= 
0.64). To test the direct effect of Donation Variety on gift amount, we compare the difference in 
average expected gift amount across donors with low and high levels of Donation Variety. The 
average expected gift size is $115.62 for donors who give to only one initiative. The average 
expected gift amount for donors with low and high levels of Donation Variety is $394.76 and 
$795.80, respectively. These results indicate a significant and positive direct effect of Donation 
Variety on gift amount. 
Next, we test the interaction effect of Donation Variety and macroeconomic condition (See 
Figure 2.3a). Economic conditions below and above the trend line derived from the HP-filter are 
classified as negative and positive economic conditions, respectively. As it is shown in Figure 
2.3a, as economic condition declines, donors decrease their financial support for the university 
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foundation.
10
 However, the decrease in financial support is much greater for donors who give to 
a single initiative than donors who give to multiple initiatives. 
While we do not formally hypothesize the moderating effect of Donation Variety on 
marketing efforts, we still include the interaction between the two marketing variables and 
Donation Variety to control for the potential impact of marketing efforts by the university 
foundation. We want to see whether there is some evidence that donors with different levels of 
Donation Variety tend to respond differently to marketing efforts (both impersonal and personal) 
by the university foundation (See Figure 2.3b and 2.3c). Figure 2.3b shows the interaction of 
Donation Variety and impersonal marketing costs. As it is shown, donors who receive more 
impersonal marketing efforts make larger gifts as compared to donors who receive fewer 
impersonal marketing efforts. The difference in average gift size for the two groups becomes 
larger as donors give to a more varied portfolio of initiatives. Figure 2.3c shows the interaction 
effect of Donation Variety and personal marketing effort. Given that the majority of donors 
receive no personal marketing effort, we split donors into two groups: donors who receive no 
personal marketing, and donors who receive some personal marketing. Figure 2.3c shows that 
personal marketing effort is mostly targeted at high-value donors. However, we can see that the 
difference in average gift size for donors who receive some marketing and donors who receive 
no marketing becomes much larger for donors with higher levels of Donation Variety.  
 
 
                                                     
10
 We note that the focal university does not alter its marketing budget in accordance with changes in 
macroeconomic condition (i.e. the budget does not increase (decrease) in good (bad) macroeconomic 
conditions). 
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Comparing Donation Variety with Breadth and Depth of Donations 
 
 Further, we want to see whether our proposed measure of Donation Variety (see Equation 1) 
outperforms measures commonly used to represent the depth and breadth of a customer or 
donor’s relationship with an organization (e.g. Crossbuy and Depth of Buying). In this case, we 
created 2 variables which represent the depth and breadth of giving: the total number of 
initiatives supported by donor i up to time t-1 (breadth of giving) and the accumulated amount of 
gifts by donor i up to time t-1 (depth of giving).We called these two measures cross-donation and 
total donation. First, we measured the correlation of the Donation Variety with these other two 
measures. The correlation of Donation Variety with number of initiatives supported (breadth) 
and cumulative gift amount (depth) are 0.762 and 0.307 respectively.  
This suggests that these variables seem to represent the same construct measuring the depth 
and breadth in relationship a donor has with a nonprofit organization. However, when we only 
compare the cases where the Donation Variety is positive (i.e. giving to multiple initiatives), the 
correlations with number of initiatives supported and cumulative gift amount are 0.604 and 0.034 
respectively. This seems to suggest that, as the distribution of support to each initiative varies, 
the measure of Donation Variety we use in this study begins to capture subtle differences from 
the separate measures of the number of cross-donation and depth of donation.  
We also want to see the economic significance of the difference in the results when we use 
the measure Donation Variety versus cross-donation and total donation. To do this, we estimate 
the models from Equations 3 and 5 after substituting cross-donation and total donation for 
Donation Variety (see the results of the estimation in Appendix 2.C). In general, we find cross-
donation and total donation are significant in each of the Probit models and in the main model 
(the same as Donation Variety). To test the in-sample model fit differences, we compare the 
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MAD and MAPE of the expected donation value for all donors in all time periods in the 
observation window. We find the in-sample MAD (MAPE) for the Donation Variety model is 
$60.11 (17.27%) and for the cross-donation and total donation model is $70.97 (18.38%). This 
suggests that the model with a single measure of Donation Variety captures more of the variation 
in expected donation amounts than the model with separate variables representing the breadth 
(cross-donation) and depth (total donations) of donations. Next, we test the out-of-sample fit of 
the model. To do this, we used the coefficients from the models to select the ‘best’ donors based 
on the predicted expected donation in FY 2013, given the original observation window of the 
data is to the end of FY 2012. We then see if the foundation is better off selecting the top 
percentiles of donors (10%, 15%, and 25%) based on expected donation from the Donation 
Variety or cross-donation and total donation models (See Table 2.3). 
We see from Table 2.3 that, whether the foundation selects the top 10%, 15%, or 25% of 
donors based on the expected giving amount predicted by the two different models, that the 
model using Donation Variety helps the university foundation select donors with higher giving 
amounts in FY 2013 by 6.7%, 6.2%, and 5.4% respectively. All of these results suggest that 
using the proposed measure of Donation Variety is more valuable than the traditional (and 
separate) measures of breadth (cross-donation) and depth (total donation), as Donation Variety is 
a single measure (rather than two independent measures) that captures both the breadth and 
distribution of depth of donations made to a nonprofit organization. 
Discussion 
 
In Study 1 we explored what drives a donor to support multiple initiatives and how the 
decision made by a donor to support one vs. multiple initiatives has an impact on that donor’s 
future value to the nonprofit organization. We found that at the acquisition stage, donor intrinsic 
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motivations (marketing efforts) are more (less) effective at driving donors to give to multiple 
initiatives and increasing Donation Variety, confirming hypothesis H1 (H2). This suggests that at 
the acquisition phase, nonprofit organizations should look for donors with the ‘right’ donor 
profile (i.e. characteristics that match donors with higher Donation Variety) to acquire donors 
with the highest probability of giving to multiple initiatives in their initial gift. At the retention 
phase, nonprofit organizations seem to have more influence in getting donors to give to multiple 
initiatives and increase Donation Variety. This suggests that any initiative by the nonprofit 
organization to influence Donation Variety will likely be more effective if applied to donors who 
have already made gifts (retention) rather than donors who have yet to make a gift (acquisition). 
In regard to the effect of a donor’s decision to distribute her gifts across multiple initiatives 
on the donor’s future value, we found donors who give to a more varied profile of initiatives in 
the past to be willing to donate more in the future, confirming H3. Level of Donation Variety has 
a significant positive effect on probability of donation. The average amount of a gift when a 
donation is made is also almost twice as large for donors who distribute their past donations 
across more initiatives evenly. We also find that Donation Variety has significant moderating 
impact on the effect of macroeconomic condition on a donor’s giving. We found donors with a 
higher degree of Donation Variety are far less affected by the bad economy and their support 
drops by only 1.84%. In contrast, donors who give to a single initiative, decrease their support by 
87.5% as economic conditions significantly decline, confirming H4. Thus, encouraging donors to 
distribute their support across more initiatives can help nonprofit organizations retain their 
valuable donors and maintain donation levels even during an economic downturn. Therefore, it is 
worthwhile for the nonprofit organization to identify what motivates donors to increase the depth 
and breadth of giving (i.e. Donation Variety). 
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To validate our empirical finding, we run a field study with the focal university foundation of 
the empirical study to test whether the university foundation can use targeted marketing efforts to 
influence current donors to increase Donation Variety.  
Study 2: Field Study 
 
Given that we find that donors with a higher Donation Variety are more valuable to the 
university foundation than donors with a lower Donation Variety, we propose a field study to 
determine the extent to which efforts by the university foundation can be targeted at donors to 
encourage giving across multiple initiatives. The main benefit of running this field study is two-
fold. First, a field study offers strong causal evidence that nonprofit firms can actually motivate 
single initiative donors to increase their depth and breadth of giving. Second, it can provide a 
general framework for other nonprofit foundations to motivate donors to increase Donation 
Variety. In our field study, we manipulate the content of direct mail and email appeals from the 
focal university foundation to motivate single initiative donors to give to multiple initiatives and 
to motivate donors of multiple initiatives to further increase the number of initiatives supported. 
Objective and Setup 
 
Email and direct mail solicitations at this university foundation often ask donors to repeat 
their donation to the initiative(s) they have supported previously. We want to test whether 
changing the content of these email and direct mail solicitations can affect Donation Variety. We 
test if highlighting other initiatives in the university that the donor is likely to identify with can 
encourage Donation Variety. We expect that increasing Donation Variety should lead to 
increases in donation probability and total giving amounts by donors who respond favorably to 
the treated marketing communications.  
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Method 
 
The field study includes a stratified random sample of 1,200 alumni from the focal university 
who all graduated with a degree from the business school (undergraduate, MBA, and/or Ph.D.), 
made at least one donation in fiscal year (FY) 2012, and, as of January 2013, had yet to donate in 
FY 2013. We took a stratified random sample of donors which fell into one of four groups that 
include donors who had given: (1) only to the business school in the past (no Donation Variety; 
n=200), (2) to multiple initiatives including the business school in the past (positive Donation 
Variety; n=200), (3) only to one other initiative in the past, not including the business school (no 
Donation Variety; n=400), and (4) to multiple initiatives in the past, not including the business 
school (positive Donation Variety; n=400). We use these four groups so that we can differentiate 
between the effect of encouraging an alumnus to increase Donation Variety and give to schools 
other than the one they graduated from and the effect of encouraging an alumnus to donate to the 
school in which they graduated. We try to control for the latter by choosing a set of donors who 
all graduated with a degree from the same school. Before we ran the study, we wanted to confirm 
whether our stratified random samples were not significantly different from each other. To do 
this, we provide some descriptive statistics for each of the four groups (See Table 2.4). 
To see whether the groups are similar, we compare the differences in means of multiple 
variables for Groups 1 and 3 (started with no Donation Variety) and Groups 2 and 4 (started with 
positive Donation Variety). We find that there is no statistically significant difference between 
Groups 1 and 3 or Groups 2 and 4 on four dimensions: (1) average FY 2012 gift size, (2) average 
total past giving, (3) average number of years since their first gift, and (4) average time since 
graduation. We find there is no significant difference between the samples that included the 
business school and the others. This suggests donors who chose to give to single or multiple 
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initiatives, whether it included (or did not include) the business school in the past, are not 
different in their donation behaviors over time. 
For the field study, we treated each of the 200 donors from the two groups (1 and 2) who had 
given to the business school in the past as one set of controls by only targeting them with appeal 
letters which asked them to consider giving again to the same initiatives they had supported in 
the past, including the business school (i.e. the usual appeal all alumni from the focal university 
receive). We then randomly split the two groups (3 and 4) who had not yet given to the business 
school in the past into two groups of 200 each for each group. One half of each group (n = 200) 
received the control message asking them to consider giving again to the same initiatives they 
had supported in the past (not including the business school). Again, this is the usual appeal that 
each donor who gives the previous FY receives. The other half of each group received the 
treatment message asking them to consider giving to the same initiatives they had considered in 
the past and to also consider giving to the school where they had received their degree (i.e. the 
business school) as well. Thus, the only difference between the control and treated message was 
the addition of language which asked the donor to consider giving some money to the business 
school as well as the other initiative(s) that donor had supported in the past. 
The study was run during the second half of FY 2013 (six months from January 1 to June 30, 
2013). Initial emails and direct mails were sent to participants in January, and each donor 
received one email and one direct mail. A follow-up email and direct mail was sent in the 
beginning of May as a reminder to those donors who had yet to give in FY 2013. Donations were 
collected and recorded until the end of the FY 2013.  
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Results 
 
 To determine whether the field study was successful, we first want to determine whether 
donors who have already given to the business school in the past are similar in their giving 
patterns to donors who have yet to give to the business school. To do this, we compare the results 
for the control Groups 1 and 3 (no Donation Variety) and for the treated Groups 2 and 4 (positive 
Donation Variety). For Groups 1 and 3, we see that, out of the 200 donors contacted for each 
group with the control message, 86 and 88 donors respectively, responded positively with a 
donation (See Table 2.5 for detailed results). Further, we see that the average gift amount for 
Group 1 was $398 and for Group 3 was $381, which is not statistically significantly different (t = 
0.65; p = 0.51). For Groups 2 and 4, we see that, out of the 200 donors contacted for each group 
with the control message, 140 and 141 donors respectively, responded positively with a donation. 
We also see that the average gift amount for Group 2 was $642 and for Group 4 was $625, which 
is not statistically significantly different (t = 0.35; p = 0.73). This suggests that any difference 
between the treatment and control groups for Groups 3 and 4 should be as a result of the change 
in marketing content and not from a donor’s different giving histories. 
Next, we want to see whether encouraging donors to increase their Donation Variety by 
asking them to consider adding the business school as another recipient of their donation was 
successful. To do this, we want to compare the results with Group 3 and Group 4 across the 
treatment and control groups. We see for Group 3 (no previous Donation Variety) that asking the 
donor to consider the business school as an initiative to support led to an increase from 88 to 119 
gifts, a 35% increase in repeat giving, and an increase in the average gift size from $381 to $489, 
a 28% increase in donation size (t = 4.57; p < 0.01). Further, we saw an increase in Donation 
Variety from 0 to 0.395. We see for Group 4 (had positive Donation Variety) that asking the 
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donor to consider the business school as an initiative to support led to an increase from 141 to 
144 gifts, a 2% increase in repeat giving, and an increase in the average gift size from $625 to 
$835, a 33% increase in donation size (t = 4.13; p < 0.01). Further, we saw an increase in 
Donation Variety from 0.573 to 0.661.  
 Discussion 
 
 The results of this field study suggest that encouraging donors to support additional 
initiatives (especially when the additional initiative has a high degree of fit) can successfully 
increase both the number of donors who repeat and the donation amount. In the case of donors 
who have never spread gifts across multiple initiatives before (Group 3), we see that there was a 
significant increase in both the percentage of donors who were retained from the previous year 
and the average value of each donor’s total gift. However, in the case of donors who have 
already spread gifts across multiple initiatives before (Group 4), we see that there was only a 
significant increase in the average value of each donor’s total gift. This suggests that, when 
donors have only given to one initiative, successfully aligning the donor with an initiative which 
has a high degree of fit (in this case being an alumnus of the focal school) can impact both the 
total size of the gift and the decision of the donor to give in the first place. When donors are 
already spreading donations across multiple initiatives, encouraging donors to give to another 
initiative with a high degree of fit does not seem to affect the decision of the donor to make a gift 
to the university. However, it does seem to significantly increase the total amount of the gift. 
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Implications to Marketing Theory and Practice 
Theoretical Implications  
 
 This study empirically tests the effect of the distribution of gifts across multiple initiatives of 
a non-profit, i.e., Donation Variety, on a donor’s future value to the nonprofit and identifies 
factors that increase Donation Variety. The results of this study have several implications to 
marketing theory. First, we find that the amount and distribution of gifts across multiple donation 
options (measure of Donation Variety) is a good predictor of future donation behavior. We show 
that donors with a higher level of Donation Variety of their past gifts are more likely to give in 
the future and, conditional on the gift being made, are likely to give more than donors with a 
lower degree of Donation Variety. This offers some empirical validation to the literature on 
social impact theory and donor-nonprofit relationship management. In other words, donors who 
are more broadly tied to the nonprofit organization through multiple connections with various 
causes are more likely to stay engaged through subsequent gifts versus donors who may have 
given the same amount over time, but are more narrowly tied with fewer or even just one 
initiative. Further, we found empirical evidence that Donation Variety can also change a donor’s 
responsiveness to the changes in macroeconomic environment. We find that donors with a higher 
degree of Donation Variety are less responsive to negative changes in the macroeconomic 
condition, making them less risky, as their donation patterns have lower volatility with external 
shocks. Besides, we tested the interaction effect between marketing efforts and Donation 
Variety. We found that donors with a higher Donation Variety are more responsive to marketing 
efforts of the foundation. More testing is necessary to validate this conclusion, as it might be the 
case that donors who end up giving to multiple initiatives might be more responsive to marketing 
efforts even before they begin giving to multiple initiatives. However, this result does offer some 
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evidence that nonprofits can increase their return on marketing investments (ROMI) by focusing 
their marketing efforts on donors with a higher level of Donation Variety.  
Second, we find that our measure of Donation Variety is better able to capture the variation 
in donation amount and better predict the expected donation amount (both in-sample and out-of-
sample) than a measure of the number of initiatives supported and total of gift amount. This 
contributes to the literature on measurements of the depth and breadth of customer relationships. 
Further, it suggests that measures such as crossbuy (i.e. number of product categories purchase) 
commonly used in the CRM literature to measure the breadth of a relationship, could be 
enhanced by simultaneously capturing the depth of the relationship in each category purchased 
as a single measure (i.e. Purchase Variety). 
Third, this study empirically shows that factors that drive Donation Variety systematically 
change over the course of the relationship between the donor and a nonprofit organization. We 
find that at the acquisition stage, donor intrinsic motivations (marketing efforts) are more (less) 
effective at driving donors to give to multiple initiatives at the acquisition stage rather than the 
retention stage. This is an important contribution to the literature on donation behavior, as studies 
to this point have not distinguished the changes in a donor’s responsiveness to marketing efforts 
over the course of the donor-nonprofit organization relationship. In all, these findings suggest 
that measuring and understanding the distribution of gifts across multiple donation options is 
important when trying to understand a donor’s motivation to make initial and subsequent gifts to 
nonprofit organizations. 
Managerial Implications 
 
 This study also has several important implications to marketing practice. First, we provide a 
way for managers of nonprofit organizations to measure and manage the depth and breadth of 
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gifts with a single measure we call Donation Variety. From an acquisition perspective, our study 
indicates that nonprofits should focus on trying to align donors with causes that are ‘close to the 
heart’ – whether it is one specific cause or many causes. However, from a retention perspective, 
our study indicates that nonprofit organizations can focus on expanding the relationship with 
donors by encouraging donors to give to additional causes rather than only continuing to support 
the same cause year after year. For many nonprofit organizations that silo their initiatives into 
separate sub-foundation departments (e.g. usually each school at a university has its own 
foundation which tries to maximize giving to that school), this suggests that the overall goal 
should be to try and share donors with other departments rather than get donors to only give to a 
single initiative. Encouraging donors to donate across multiple departments leads to an increase 
in the likelihood and amount of money a donor will provide the university on the whole in the 
future, and a buffer against the potential loss of donations due to an economic downturn. We 
even found some evidence that Donation Variety increases the responsiveness of donors to 
marketing efforts by the foundation, although further research is needed to provide stronger 
empirical evidence of the validity of this finding. 
Additionally, our study provides causal evidence of the value of Donation Variety through a 
field study applied in marketing practice. We showed that, by altering the content of the 
marketing message with an appropriate appeal to increase Donation Variety, we were able to 
increase the likelihood and amount of giving by donors who had only to that point given to 
single initiatives and increase the amount of giving by donors who already had donated to 
multiple initiatives. This is important, as it offers external validation to academic research, 
making it more likely that other marketing research studies will be implemented in practice. 
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Limitations and Further Research 
 
We do acknowledge that this study was completed with a single nonprofit organization. 
While this potentially limits the generalizability of the study, it requires significant effort to run a 
field study with a single firm (in this case an educational foundation), which is a significant 
contribution of this study. Further, while gifts to foundations make up a significant amount of the 
total giving to nonprofit organizations, future research in the nonprofit context can address this 
issue by continuing to test how depth and breadth of supporting multiple causes and fundraising 
projects offered by a nonprofit might affect a donor’s total value to the nonprofit across different 
types of nonprofit organizations. Additionally, the findings from the study, with regard to 
measuring both depth and breadth of giving as a single measure, suggest that future research test 
whether a similar measure of purchase variety better captures cross-buying behavior. 
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Table 2.1 Variable operationalizations and descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Operationalization  
Single vs. Multiple Giving Behavior 
Multiple Giving  
4.40% N/A % of the sample who gave to multiple initiatives in their first gift 
67.60% N/A % of the sample who have given to multiple initiatives by the end of FY 2012 
Time until Multiple Giving 4.65 3.71 
For a donor who starts off by giving to single initiative (95.6%), the average time  
 (in years) from first donation until the donor starts to giving to a second initiative 
Donation Variety  0.42 0.40 
The average donation variety of a given donor at the end of observation period  
(FY 2012)  as measured by Equation 1 
Intrinsic Motivators 
Spouse at the University 32.10% N/A % of donors with a spouse who also went to the same university  
Number of Degrees  1.20 0.50 Average # of degrees a donor received from the University 
Extrinsic Motivators
*
  
Personal Marketing (#) 0.09 0.35 
Average # of times each donor was invited to fundraising events and received  
personal visits from the university foundation each year 
Impersonal Marketing (#) 0.49 0.36 Average # of mails and phone calls each donor received each year 
Control Variables 
Gender 59.30% N/A % of female donors 
In-state Resident 60.80% N/A % of donors residing in the same state as the focal university 
Time Since Graduation 17.65  4.44  
Average number of years since graduation  at the end of observation period (FY 
2012)  
Average AGI $73,076  $48,243  Average adjusted gross income (AGI) at the zip code level 
Average Charitable 
Contribution  
3.20% 2.60% Average % of the AGI donated at the zip code level  
Exchange Variables 
Average Donation Amount ($) $381  $4,132  Average amount of donation per donor per year ($) 
Total Donation Amount ($) $2,391  $17,822  
Average total amount of donation ($) made by each donor over the observation 
period 
Total Number of Gifts  11.2 17.2 Average total # of gifts made by each donor over the observation period 
 
     * We use actual Personal and Impersonal Marketing Costs in the model rather than just the number of touches. However, we cannot provide the descriptive statistics (mean and    
standard deviation) of marketing costs at the request of the university foundation. We can note that the cost of each personal marketing touch is significantly larger (> 10x) than 
that of each impersonal marketing touch 
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TABLE 2.2: Results for the drivers and consequences models 
 
Variables 
DV = Varietyit DV = ln(Giftit) 
Selection 
Coeff. (Std. 
Err.) 
Main  
Coeff. (Std. 
Err.) 
Selection 
Coeff. (Std. Err.) 
Main  
Coeff. (Std. 
Err.) 
Intercept -2.223 (0.027)
*
 0.177 (0.005)
*
 -0.032 (0.025)
n/s
 2.412 (0.046)
*
 
ln(Gifti,t-1) 0.102 (0.003)
*
 0.012 (0.0004)
*
 0.204 (0.003)
*
 0.252 (0.005)
*
 
Varietyi,t-1 2.870 (0.021)
*
 0.802 (0.003)
*
 0.071 (0.021)
*
 0.157 (0.032)
*
 
Firstit 0.159 (0.078)
**
 0.150 (0.037)
*
 --- --- 
Extrinsic 
ImpMktgCostit 0.012 (0.003)
*
 0.011 (0.001)
*
 0.044 (0.009)
* 
0.130 (0.020)
*
 
PerMktgCostit 0.096 (0.005)
*
 0.002 (0.0002)
*
 0.006 (0.002)
*
 0.032 (0.007)
*
 
Econt 6.793 (0.397)
*
 0.118 (0.054)
**
 1.524 (0.377)
*
 4.753 (0.503)
*
 
Intrinsic 
Degreesit 0.092 (0.013)
*
 0.010 (0.002)
*
 0.065 (0.013)
*
 0.087 (0.025)
*
 
Spousei 0.256 (0.013)
*
 0.008 (0.002)
*
 0.093 (0.014)*
 
0.005 (0.027)
n/s
 
Interaction Effects 
Varietyi,t-
1*ImpMktgCostit 
--- --- 0.043 (0.004)
*
 0.003 (0.001)
*
 
Varietyi,t-
1*PerMktgCostit 
--- --- 0.001 (0.0004)
**
 0.002 (0.0005)
*
 
Varietyi,t-1*Econt --- --- -4.143 (0.774)
*
 -0.606 (0.101)
*
 
Firstit*ImpMktgCostit -0.015 (0.003)
*
 -0.001 (0.0004)
**
 --- --- 
Firstit*PerMktgCostit -0.002 (0.001)
**
 -0.003 (0.0008)
*
 --- --- 
Firstit*Degreesit 0.106 (0.053)
**
 0.006 (0.003)
**
 --- --- 
Firstit*Spousei 0.065 (0.013)
*
 0.001 (0.0002)
*
 --- --- 
Control Variables 
Genderi 0.044 (0.012)
*
 0.016 (0.002)
*
 0.039 (0.013)
*
 0.439 (0.026)
*
 
Locationi 0.036 (0.012)
*
 0.015 (0.002)
*
 0.054 (0.014)
*
 0.054 (0.025)
**
 
Time Since Graduationit 0.089 (0.022)
*
 0.002 (0.0003)
*
 -0.071 (0.002)
*
 0.033 (0.003)
*
 
AvgAGIit 0.001 (0.0001)
*
 0.0003 (0.0002)
n/s
 0.0002 (0.0001)
**
 0.003 (0.0003)
*
 
AvgGivingit 0.655 (0.228)
*
 0.039 (0.038)
n/s
 0.064 (0.024)
*
 0.643 (0.259)
**
 
Control Function Variables 
ImpMktgErrori,t -0.012 (0.012)
n/s
 0.012 (0.001)
*
 -0.058 (0.009)
*
 -0.146 (0.020)
*
 
PerMktgErrori,t -0.093 (0.005)
*
 0.002 (0.0002)
*
 0.009 (0.002)
*
 -0.028 (0.007)
*
 
Model Fit 
Log Pseudolikelihood -13,723.53 -107,989.78 
   * Significant at p-value < 0.01; ** Significant at p-value < 0.05; n/s Not significant at p-value < 0.05 
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TABLE 2.3: Donor selection using donation variety and cross-donation/total donation
a
 
Percent of Donors Selected in 
FY2013 
Donation Variety 
Cross-Donation (Breadth) and 
Total Donation (Depth) 
Top 10% of Donors $94.9k $88.9k 
Top 15% of Donors $104.2k $98.1k 
Top 25% of Donors $115.9k $110.0k 
             a Total values are all rescaled by the same constant at the request of the focal university foundation 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.4: Descriptive statistics for field study 
Group 
2012 Gift 
Size
a
 
Total Past 
Giving
a
 
Years Since 
First Gift
a
 
Time Since 
Graduation
a
 
(1) No Variety – Only B-School $447 ($270) $2,208 ($5,743) 12.7 (6.7) 21.5 (15.2) 
(2) Variety – Including B-School $801 ($410) $8,989 ($15,899) 13.4 (6.1) 25.0 (11.1) 
(3) No Variety – No B-School $455 ($255) $2,402 ($6,192) 12.9 (6.3) 21.4 (15.4) 
(4) Variety – No B-School $790 ($428) $8,690 ($15,024) 13.2 (5.9) 24.4 (11.4) 
   a Mean (Std. Dev.) 
 
 
TABLE 2.5: Results from the field study 
 Message Content 
Group Control Treatment 
(1) No Variety – Only B-School 
Made a Gift (%): 86 (43%) 
Avg. Gift (Std. Dev.): $398 ($261) 
N/A 
(2) Variety – Including B-School 
Made a Gift (%): 140 (70%) 
Avg. Gift (Std. Dev.): $642 ($494) 
N/A 
(3) No Variety – No B-School 
Made a Gift (%): 88 (44%) 
Avg. Gift (Std. Dev.): $381 ($260) 
Made a Gift (%): 119 (59.5%) 
Avg. Gift (Std. Dev.): $489 ($210) 
(4) Variety – No B-School 
Made a Gift (%): 141 (70.5%) 
Avg. Gift (Std. Dev.): $625 ($487) 
Made a Gift (%): 144 (72%) 
Avg. Gift (Std. Dev.): $835 ($530) 
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Figure 2.1: Model free evidence: before and after giving to multiple initiatives 
 
 
            
 
Figure 2.2a: Degrees and donor lifecycle 
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Figure 2.2b: Spouse and donor lifecycle 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2c: Impersonal marketing and donor lifecycle 
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Figure 2.2d: Personal marketing and donor lifecycle 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3a: Economic condition and donation variety 
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Figure 2.3b: Impersonal marketing and donation variety 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3c: Personal marketing and donation variety 
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CHAPTER 3: CUSTOMER LOYALTY PROGRAM USAGE ACROSS FIRMS 
 
Abstract  
Many firms across various industries offer loyalty programs, each with the goal of enhancing 
customer retention at their respective firms. However, it is common that customers are members 
of and influenced by loyalty programs across many different firms. This research investigates 
how a customer’s loyalty program usage, in this case reward redemption, with a focal firm’s 
loyalty program impacts that customer’s search and transaction behavior at the focal firm as well 
as with competing firms. To do this, we use a novel dataset from a mobile advertising and 
loyalty app provider which partners with multiple firms and allows customers to manage 
relationships with independent loyalty programs across those different firms. The dataset 
includes a random sample of 2051 customers from the mobile app that have interacted with six 
local restaurants over a 90-week period. Our analysis reveals that over time customers buy less 
frequently at each store while purchasing across more stores. However, redeeming a reward at 
one store can keep the customer more loyal to that store. We match customers based on their 
probability of redeeming a reward at the focal store and we find that within a short period post-
redemption (8 weeks), customers who redeem a reward will visit the store more often and spend 
more on average, as compared to those customers who have accumulated the same amount of 
points, but did not redeem any reward.  Interestingly, we see that during this period customers 
who redeemed a reward will also become more interested in competitive offerings, and will visit 
other stores more often and spend more across these stores as compared to non-redeemers. These 
findings suggest that redeeming a reward has positive effect on customer behavior at the focal 
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store, but also makes them more prone to look for other offers once they utilize the points they 
have accumulated at that store. Furthermore, our analysis of redeemers’ post-redemption 
behavior reveals that redeeming a reward has much more positive effect on light users as 
compared to heavy users. This suggests that firms should not focus their reward programs only 
on their most frequent customers, and should also reward their less engaged customers as a 
means to increase their loyalty to the firm.  
Keywords: Loyalty programs, Reward redemptions, Point pressure, Rewarded behavior 
Introduction  
 
Most firms have adopted loyalty programs to enhance customer profitability by offering 
customers rewards for repeat purchases. However, most customers are not 100% loyal to one 
firm. Instead, customers are often members of loyalty programs at competing firms and make 
purchases across those competing firms over time. This behavior is referred to as “polygamous 
loyalty” (Dowling and Uncles 1997). One of the key reasons customers might make purchases 
across firms with different loyalty programs is to maximize the benefits they receive from those 
competing loyalty programs
11
. For instance, in a recent survey of airline loyalty members, 84% 
of shoppers say airline loyalty programs influence them to engage with a particular brand
12
. Yet, 
only 10% of fliers are loyal to an airline, and half of those would switch if given $50 off another 
                                                     
11
 2015 Loyalty Report, Bond Brand Loyalty, available from: http://info.bondbrandloyalty.com/the-
loyalty-report-2015  
 
12
  2014 Shopper Experience Study, available from: http://www.cognizant.com/shopper-experience-study 
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airline
13
. This provides some evidence that a customer’s behavior with a given firm can be 
simultaneously dependent on the focal and competing firm’s loyalty program benefits. 
Thus, in order to investigate how a loyalty program affects a customer’s behavior in a 
competitive market, one needs to consider a customer’s interactions across all firms and loyalty 
programs (Leenheer et al. 2007; Liu and Yang 2009). However due to data limitations, research 
in the customer relationship management (CRM) literature, specifically with regard to loyalty 
programs, is often studied within the frame of a single firm (e.g.  Bolton, Kannan, and Bramlett 
2000; Kivetz and Simonson 2002; Lal and Bell 2003; Lewis 2004; Liu 2007; Kopalle et al. 2012; 
Taylor and Neslin 2005). There has yet to be much research that sheds light on how customers 
interact across firms with competing loyalty programs. The goal of our research is to cover this 
gap by exploring customer loyalty program usage across competing firms. More specifically, our 
study answers the following key research question: 
How does loyalty program usage at a given firm impact a customer’s future behavior at the 
focal firm and future behavior with competing firms? 
 
Here we define customer behavior as both a customer’s search and purchase behavior at a 
given firm, where search behavior includes search for rewards and purchase behavior includes 
both the frequency of purchase and the average amount of purchase. To answer our key research 
question we investigate how loyalty program usage, in this case reward redemption, at one firm 
affects customer search and purchase behavior at both the focal and competing firms.  
Our research contributes to a better understanding of the impact of loyalty programs on 
customer behavior in two ways. First, we investigate the effect of loyalty program usage on 
customer behavior at the focal firm, controlling for that customer’s interaction across competing 
                                                     
13
 Fly.com Survey; available from: www.fly.com/release/3185/download  
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firms. In many product categories, customers make purchases across multiple firms and may be a 
member of multiple loyalty programs that these firms offer to their customers. By purchasing 
across multiple firms over time, a customer accumulates loyalty points at more than one firm. 
Once a customer redeems some (or all) of the points she has accumulated at one firm to receive a 
reward, that customer faces a decision to either: (1) accumulate more points for future 
redemption opportunities at the focal firm by continuing to purchase at that firm, or (2) increase 
purchases at one or some other firms in order to receive benefits from a competitor’s loyalty 
program as well. Therefore, getting a reward from a loyalty program may impact a customer’s 
future transactions with that firm, specifically if the customer is simultaneously a member of 
other multiple loyalty programs. By controlling for customers’ purchases across competing 
firms, we can isolate how redeeming a reward at one firm impacts a customer’s future 
relationship with that firm.   
Second, we investigate how a customer’s loyalty program usage at the focal firm potentially 
spills over onto that customer’s search and purchase behavior across competing firms. The 
majority of research on loyalty programs study the impact of loyalty program on customer 
behavior within a single firm and do not consider the cross-firm effects of loyalty programs on 
customer behavior (Leenheer et al. 2007; Liu 2007; Liu and Yang 2009; Verhoef 2003).  Of the 
few studies that consider multiple loyalty programs most, focus on program membership and  
investigate whether membership in multiple loyalty programs affects customer share of wallet 
across firms (e.g. Mägi 2003; Meyer-Waarden 2007; Leenheer et al. 2007; Liu and Yang 2009; 
Kopalle and Neslin 2001; Zhang and Breugelmans 2012). Unlike these studies, we investigate 
how actual usage of a loyalty program (i.e. redemption of a reward) at one firm affects customer 
behavior across firms. We believe that studying customers’ active usages of loyalty programs 
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can generate insights about how loyalty programs affect customer behavior in a competitive 
market (Dorotic et al. 2011 and 2014; Taylor and Neslin 2005).  
Third, we focus on those customers who redeemed a reward and investigate the differences 
in their pre- and post-redemption behavior. We would like to know whether getting a reward 
from a firm may induce different responses from different types of customers, specifically more 
versus less frequent customers. A general perception among managers is that loyal customers 
who purchase more frequently from a firm are the best target for loyalty programs. A firm can 
use a loyalty program to reward its best customers and increase the sale to these loyal customers 
(Reinartz and Kumar 2002; Wansink 2003). However, some recent studies have shown that 
loyalty programs generate more positive outcomes for less frequent customers than for loyal 
customers (Lal and Bell 2003; Liu 2007).  Therefore, we would like to test whether reward 
redemption causes different responses from loyal and casual customers.  
We answer our key research questions by analyzing customer behavior across six loyalty 
programs of competitive local vendors in a city in the mid-Atlantic region of the United States 
that encompasses a major public university. Our empirical analysis shows that a customer’s 
search and purchase behavior evolves within a loyalty program at a firm over time and that a 
customer’s usage of the loyalty program at one firm impacts that customer’s search and purchase 
behaviors at the focal firm and across competing firms. At the focal firm, redeeming a reward 
has positive effect on a customer’s future search and purchase behavior at that firm. This 
provides support to the CRM literature which suggests that rewards from loyalty programs 
usually increase future customer retention and purchase behavior.  
Further, we also find that there is a spillover effect of loyalty program usage at one firm on 
the customer’s behavior at competing firms. Customers who redeemed a reward at one firm 
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search more for rewards across other firms as compared to customers who have not yet redeemed 
a reward at the focal firm. Once customers redeem a reward at the focal firm, they also broaden 
their purchase consideration set and start to transact more frequently with other firms suggesting 
that reward redemption can in some cases cause the customer to explore new options at 
competing firms. This key finding suggests that firms should be careful in designing loyalty 
programs which take into account not only the positive impact of customer behavior at the focal 
firm, but also the potential that reward redemptions at the focal firm may influence customers to 
search and transact more with competing firms.  
Finally, we run an exploratory analysis of post-redemption behavior for customers who 
redeemed a reward at one of the focal firms. We find that heavy users decrease their spending 
after redeeming a reward, while light users continue to purchase at same rate after redemption. 
These findings suggest that firms should not focus their reward programs only on their most 
frequent customers, and should also reward their less engaged customers as a means to maintain 
their loyalty to the firm. 
Overall, our analysis highlights the importance of both between-group comparisons of the 
behavior of redeemers and non-redeemers as well as within-group comparison of redeemers. If 
we only consider the post-redemption behavior of redeemers, it seems that redemption has a 
negative effect on customer behavior for heavy users, and no significant effect on behavior of 
light users. However, compared to non-redeemers, those who redeem a reward do stay more 
loyal to the focal firm on average. This is an important observation, specifically for product 
categories in which consumers’ variety seeking is relatively high, and it might help to explain the 
mixed support found by studies on the effectiveness of loyalty programs (e.g. Leenheer et al. 
2007; Magi 2003; Shugan 2005).  
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Theory Development  
 
Customers go through a series of stages in their buying process. Before making a decision to 
purchase, a customer seeks information about available alternatives. This information can come 
from prior experiences with a product or firm or by searching for new information. Based on 
personal experiences and additional information gathered through search, the customer can then 
evaluate the utility of making a purchase at a given firm. As long as the utility of purchasing is 
positive for at least one of the alternatives, the customer will choose to purchase the alternative 
with the highest utility.  
One factor that can positively influence the utility of purchasing is the presence of a reward 
program. If a firm offers a reward program, the customer will accumulate points based on all of 
the past and current purchases. Those points can be redeemed to obtain rewards, e.g. free or 
discounted products, upgrades, and/or additional services. These rewards can have instant effect 
on purchase utility (e.g. discount and coupons), or may have a long term effect (i.e. customer 
accumulates points to obtain a reward in future). Therefore, loyalty reward programs can 
influence a customer’s choice of a firm over time. A customer may prefer a firm who offers more 
rewards for one dollar worth of purchase as compared to competitors, or that customer may be 
willing to pay a higher price for a product to accumulate more points. Once a customer has 
accumulated enough points from a firm, that customer can make a decision on whether to redeem 
points for a reward at that firm on a subsequent purchase occasion. If the customer chooses to 
use points in order to redeem a reward for a given purchase, then the customer can evaluate 
whether to purchase again at the same firm or whether it is worthwhile to explore other purchase 
options at other firms in the future.  
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We expect that redeeming a reward impacts a customer’s purchase behavior through two 
behavioral mechanisms: the point pressure mechanism and the rewarded behavior mechanism. 
Before redemption, the point pressure effect motivates customers to increase their purchase rates 
and amounts in order to reach the threshold to obtain a reward (Kopalle et al. 2012; Lewis 2004; 
Taylor and Neslin 2005). Then once a customer redeems a reward, two things happen. First, the 
point pressure decreases as the customer is no longer as close to obtaining a reward, and second, 
the rewarded behavior mechanism motivates the customer to make future transactions with the 
focal firm (Dreze and Nunes 2011; Taylor and Neslin 2005). We provide more details on these 
two mechanisms below. 
Point Pressure Mechanism  
 
The point pressure mechanism suggests that as a customer gets closer to obtaining a reward, 
that customer often increases purchase rates and amounts until she obtains enough points to 
qualify for a reward. This process of accelerating purchase behavior as a customer gets close to 
having enough points to redeem a reward has two main drivers: switching costs and forward-
looking orientation (Taylor and Neslin 2005). Customers tend to perceive a higher switching cost 
due to the increasing anticipation of obtaining a reward. For example, Taylor and Neslin (2005) 
study a grocery store's reward program and found that point pressure has a significant effect on 
customers who are more inclined to immediate price discounts. In addition, the point pressure 
effect becomes even stronger as a customer progresses toward obtaining a reward (Hartmann and 
Viard 2008; Kivetz, Urminsky, and Zheng 2006). On the other hand, a forward-looking customer 
takes into account the utility of future periods into her current purchase decision, suggesting that 
the opportunity cost of forgoing points at the focal firm can be relatively high and influence a 
customer to continue to purchase until that customer can redeem points for a reward (Lewis 
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2004). For example, in an experimental study, Nunes and Derez (2006) manipulate the level of 
progress toward a goal. Their study shows that the likelihood of completing the task is higher 
when a task is perceived to be undertaken partially as compared to a task that has not yet begun. 
This suggests that forward-looking customers are more likely to account for the total value of 
their points already accumulated in future transaction opportunities. And, the closer the customer 
is to a reward, the more the customer will value obtaining reward points from the focal firm. 
Several studies report the existence of the point pressure effect in different reward programs 
including a hotel’s reward program (Kopalle et al. 2012), a grocery store's reward program (Lal 
and Bell 2003; Taylor and Neslin 2005), and coalition loyalty program of multiple retailers 
across industries (Dorotic et al. 2014). Specifically, Dorotic and colleagues (2014) show that 
customer purchase increases prior to redemption even in a reward program with no point 
expiration in which customers can redeem a reward at any time.  
Based on this empirical evidence, the point pressure mechanism is likely to have a significant 
impact on increasing customer purchase behavior at the focal firm immediately before the 
customer has accumulated enough points for a reward redemption. However, once a customer 
redeems some (or all) of her points at one firm, the point pressure at that firm is likely to 
decrease. This will lower the value the customer places on the reward program at the focal firm 
when that customer is making a future purchase decision. Further, it also suggests that there is a 
higher likelihood that a customer will find a competing alternative more attractive as reward 
points at the focal firm no longer play as significant a role in driving the utility of a future 
purchase. 
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Rewarded Behavior Mechanism  
 
Rewarded behavior is the long-term impact of a loyalty program on a customer’s ongoing 
purchase behavior. Without the rewarded behavior effect, rewards can act like a promotion only 
increasing short-term sales, but can have little, no, or even a negative impact (i.e. stockpiling) 
after the promotion ends (Taylor and Neslin 2005). The two main drivers of the rewarded 
behavior mechanism are behavioral learning and cognitive affect. Based on behavioral learning 
theory, when a customer is rewarded for her purchases, the customer is more likely to repeat 
purchase (Rothschild and Gaidis 1981; Taylor and Neslin 2005). This happens as the customer 
learns to associate rewards with purchases from a given firm. And over time, the customer 
begins to value purchases from that firm even more regardless of the amount of reward points the 
customer currently has in her loyalty program account. From a cognitive affect perspective, 
receiving a reward prompts feelings of gratitude and appreciation toward the firm. This positive 
feeling enhances the customer’s attitudinal loyalty and increases the likelihood that the customer 
will purchase again from the same firm (Dorotic et al. 2014; Lewis 2004; Drèze and Nunes 2011; 
Taylor and Neslin 2005).  
Several studies have found evidence of the rewarded behavior mechanism. Taylor and 
Neslin’s (2005) empirical study shows an increase in store sales over a 7-week period after the 
reward period ended. This is evidence that customers continued to value purchasing at the firm 
even when the value of the reward went away. Kopalle and colleagues (2012) study a hotel 
loyalty program, which has both components of frequency reward and customer tiers. Their 
analyses show that both components have a positive effect on rewarded behavior effect. 
However, customer tier can generate a stronger rewarded behavior effect, since the customer’s 
utility of attaining a higher tier is not temporary. Their study also shows that there is customer 
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heterogeneity in the response to reward programs. They find that the rewarded behavior effect is 
stronger among the price-sensitive segment. On the other hand, Dorotic and colleagues (2014) 
provide empirical support for the rewarded behavior effect across all customer groups (age, 
income, relationship duration). The authors study customer behavior in a coalition loyalty 
program of multiple retailers across industries. Their study shows that right after reward 
redemption that there will be an increase in purchase rate and purchase amount of all groups of 
customers. These empirical studies suggest that the rewarded behavior mechanism motivates a 
customer’s future transactions with the focal firm after the customer redeems a reward at that 
firm, even if the customer is not close to receiving any rewards in the future.   
Hypotheses Development  
 
The goal of this study is to understand how a customer searches for information about as well 
as makes decisions to purchase from a focal firm and competing firms immediately after that 
customer redeems points from a loyalty program to receive a reward at the focal firm. We expect 
that the point pressure and reward behavior mechanisms will play a key role in driving that 
customer’s ongoing search and purchase behavior after reward redemption. In this section we use 
the point pressure and rewarded behavior mechanisms to help develop several hypotheses 
relating to a customer’s search for promotions as well as purchase behavior (frequency and 
amounts) immediately after a loyalty program reward redemption. 
Information search is an important stage of buying process. In addition to relying on previous 
purchase experiences, customers commonly search for information across competitive 
alternatives as they approach their decision to purchase (De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and 
Wildenbeest 2012; Moe and Fader 2004; Moorthy, Ratchford, and Talukdar 1997; Punj and 
Moore 2009; Srinivasan and Ratchford 1991; Wiesel, Pauwels, and Arts 2011). Search for 
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information not only impacts purchase decisions, but it may also impact reward redemption 
decisions. Customers who are more interested in obtaining rewards and deals are likely to gather 
more information about alternatives before making a purchase decision (DelVecchio 2005; 
Huang and Zhang 2011; Taylor and Neslin 2005). Consequently, we expect customers who 
search more for rewards offered by a firm are more likely to try to accumulate points so that they 
can redeem a reward at that firm in the future (Pancras, Venkatesan, and Li 2014). Further, we 
argue that once a customer redeems a reward at one firm, that customer’s future search before 
the next purchase occasion would be affected by the past reward redemption decision.  
Furthermore, redeeming a reward is likely to impact a customer’s decision about future 
purchases (Dreze and Nunes 2011; Lewis 2004; Taylor and Neslin 2005). Once a customer uses 
the accumulated points (some or all) to redeem a reward at one firm, the customer may choose to 
repeat purchase at the focal firm to add points to the depleted point stock and to obtain additional 
rewards in future. On the other hand, in the absence of point pressure effect at focal firm, a 
customer may switch to another firm to accumulate points for potential rewards at that firm, or 
just to add more variety to the purchase (Kahn 1995; Zhang, Krishna, and Dhar 2000). We 
expect both the rewarded behavior and point pressure mechanisms impact the customer decision 
to repurchase from the local firm or switch to another firm. 
Effect of Loyalty Program Usage on Customer Behavior at the Focal Firm  
 
We expect that redeeming a reward at the focal firm is likely to have a positive effect on a 
customer’s experience with that firm (Drèze and Nunes 2011; Roehm, Pullins, and Roehm 
2002). The rewarded behavior mechanism suggests that once a customer redeems a reward at a 
firm, that customer becomes more interested in redemption opportunities to re-experience the joy 
of being rewarded at that firm. This suggests that the customer who receives a reward is likely to 
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search for rewards offered by the focal firm more than a customer who has not yet experienced 
the rewarded behavior effect. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1a: Reward redemption at the focal firm has positive effect on future search for rewards 
offered by the focal firm. 
 
The rewarded behavior mechanism suggests that redemption has positive impact on customer 
loyalty and the likelihood of repeat purchase at the focal firm. As discussed, multiple studies 
show that customers who have redeemed a reward at the focal firm have greater behavorial 
loyalty to that firm (Bolton, Kannan, and Bramlett 2000; Lal and Bell 2003; Roehm, Pullins, and 
Roehm 2002; Taylor and Neslin 2005). Further, it is reasonable to assume that customers have a 
budget constraint which can limit their spending level. However, we expect that a redemption of 
reward is perceived by the customer as a cost savings which allows the customers to spend some 
(or all) of that cost savings on future immediate purchases. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H1b: Reward redemption has a positive effect on the future purchase frequency at the focal 
firm. 
 
H1c: Reward redemption has a positive effect on the future purchase amount at the focal 
firm. 
 
Effect of Loyalty Program Usage on Customer Behavior across Other Firms  
 
The point pressure mechanism suggests that before redemption, a customer is highly 
motivated to transact more with the focal firm to reach the threshold of rewards offered by that 
firm. However, the point pressure effect is likely to diminish once the customer redeems a 
reward at the firm. Depletion of point stock suppresses the urge to make all transactions at one 
firm in hope of obtaining a reward since the ability to obtain a reward is now much farther away 
into the future. This can give the customer a perceived opportunity to shop around and explore 
new options. Further, we expect that the rewarded behavior mechanism will make customers 
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more interested in understanding how to obtain rewards available at competing firms now that 
they have recently experienced the value of redeeming a reward (even though it was not at the 
focal firm). As a result, we expect that customers who have redeemed a reward at one firm are 
likely to search more across competing firms than customers who have not yet used their 
accumulated points to get a reward from the focal firm. Thus, we hypothesize:  
H2a: Reward redemption at the focal firm has a positive effect on future search for rewards 
offered by competing firms. 
 We argued that due to a decrease in point pressure, redeeming a reward at the focal firm has 
positive effect on a customer’s search across other firms. This search for alternatives will 
broaden customers’ consideration set and allow them to better evaluate options at other firms. 
This suggests that a customer would be more likely to examine new options and consider a 
competing firm for her next purchase occasion. Further, the customer is likely to perceive that 
the redemption of a reward from the focal firm is a cost savings (i.e. receiving something of 
monetary value for points). And, the customer is likely to see an opportunity to allocate a some 
(or all) of that cost savings to either purchase more at the focal firm or to try a new option at a 
competing firm without increasing the customer’s total budget constraint. Thus, we expect that 
the reduction in point pressure is likely to increase the customer’s desire to try alternative options 
from competitors. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2b: Reward redemption at the focal firm has a positive effect on the future purchase 
frequency across competing firms. 
 
H2c: Reward redemption at the focal firm has a positive effect on the future purchase 
amount across competing firms. 
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Empirical Application 
 
We empirically test our hypotheses using a novel dataset from a mobile advertising and 
loyalty app provider which partners with firms and allows customers to manage relationships 
with independent loyalty programs across those different firms. The majority of retailers on this 
app are local restaurants, and we focus our empirical application in the restaurant industry. We 
believe it is an appropriate industry to test our hypotheses for the following reasons: (1) It is one 
of the fastest growing sectors in terms of loyalty program memberships, and (2) There are 
currently there are more than 54 million memberships in restaurants loyalty programs across the 
United States
14
. 
Data 
 
We focus our empirical analysis on customers’ searches and transactions with multiple local 
restaurants in a US city in the mid-Atlantic surrounded by a university campus. We draw a 
sample of customers who are members of the mobile app and have interacted with at least one of 
6 local restaurants which were among the first vendors that joined the app. These restaurants are 
all located in close geographical proximity in the downtown area of the city and offer relatively 
similar menus and prices, i.e. they compete for the same set of customers in terms of location, 
price, and selection. Our dataset consists of each customer’s search, transaction, and reward 
redemption behaviors with these six restaurants over a 90-week period from July 2011 to March 
2013.   
In order to test the effect of loyalty program usage (i.e. reward redemption) on customer 
search and transaction behavior, we need to obtain a sample of customers from the database 
                                                     
14
 COLLOQUY Loyalty Census 2015, available at: https://www.colloquy.com/reports  
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which have both redeemed and not redeemed rewards at each of the restaurants. This will allow 
us to compare the behavior of a customer who redeems a reward (treatment) controlling for the 
behavior of a customer who does not redeem a reward (control). We construct our sample as 
follows. First, we need to create a sample of all of the customers that have redeemed a reward at 
each restaurant (i.e. redeemers). In this case a customer is coded as redeemer if that customer 
redeemed a reward during the observation period. Next, we need to create a sample of customers 
that have not redeemed a reward at each restaurant. We note that there are two types of non-
redeemers: (1) Those that have accumulated enough points and/or been transacting at the 
restaurant long enough to be likely to redeem a reward, and (2) those that have yet to accumulate 
enough points and/or not been a customer long enough that we would expect a redemption to 
occur. Our goal is to only sample from the customers who fit the first criteria and not the second. 
In order to do this, for redeemer group we calculate how long it takes from the first transaction 
with a firm until the customer redeems a reward at that firm. We use it as the expected 
redemption time for non-redeemers at each restaurant. Then, we drop any non-redeeming 
customer from each restaurant who either does not have the accumulated points required for a 
redemption or has not been transacting with the restaurants past the expected redemption time. 
The final sample includes 2051 customers, where 699 of these customers have redeemed at least 
one reward in one of the restaurants. During the observation period, the customers had 21,726 
transactions, and searched for rewards 2,791 times. Detailed descriptive statistics about customer 
search and purchase can be found in Table 3.1 (See Table 3.1) 
Model Free Evidence 
 
We first run an exploratory analysis on our sample of redeemers and non-redeemers. We 
calculate the average customer behavior of redeemers before and after redemption periods.  For 
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non-redeemers, we use the expected time of redemption to split the time into before and after 
redemption periods and similarly calculate the average customer behavior during these two 
periods. Figure 3.1a and 1b show the average inter-purchase time of the two groups of customers 
before and after redemptions (See Figure 3.1a and 3.1b). 
Figure 3.1a shows the average inter-purchase times at the focal firm. As we see, before 
redemption the average inter-purchase time of redeemers is shorter than non-redeemers. 
However the difference between the two groups is rather small (3.4 weeks). After the 
redemption
15
 both groups slow down their purchase rate, but there is significant difference in 
purchase rates of redeemers and non-redeemers (20 weeks). After redeeming a reward, 
redeemers keep purchasing from the focal firm, albeit less frequently than they did before 
redeeming the reward. But, it seems that customers who have not redeemed any reward 
eventually stop visiting the focal firm and abandon the points they have accumulated at that firm. 
This provides some evidence that redeeming a reward leads to more positive customer behaviors, 
in this case a shorter average inter-purchase time at the focal firm relative to non-redeemers. 
Figure 3.1b shows the average inter-purchase time of customers across competing firms 
before and after the redemption time period. Before the expected redemption time period at the 
focal firm, the non-redeemer group purchases more frequently at competing firms when 
compared to the redeemer group. In this case, the average inter-purchase time of non-redeemers 
is about 7 weeks shorter for the non-redeemer group. This is likely the case since the customers 
who are more likely to redeem at the focal firm are also more likely to purchase more frequently 
at the focal firm, i.e. less frequently at competing firms. However after the expected redemption 
time period, the average inter-purchase time for non-redeemers is 14 weeks longer as compared 
                                                     
15
 Expected redemption for non-redeemers based on average time to redemption of redeemers. 
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to the pre-redemption inter-purchase time. But for redeemers, the difference in inter-purchase 
time before and after redemption is only 1.7 weeks. 
This model free evidence provides some support for the hypotheses related to post-
redemption purchase behavior at both the focal and competing firms. However, this model free 
evidence does not control for several potential alternative explanations. For example, it does not 
control for differences across customer preferences for a given restaurant or for rewards in 
general. Thus, it is important to develop a model which can control for these alternative 
explanations and formally empirically test our hypotheses. 
Methodology 
 
Our study aims to evaluate the impact of reward redemption on customer search and 
purchase behavior. In order to do this, we need to control for how a redeemer would have 
behaved differently had she not redeemed a reward. However, this behavior is not observable 
since each customer can choose whether to redeem a reward or not. In a randomized experiment, 
one can use the average behavior of customers who have not redeemed a reward as an 
appropriate substitute for the average behavior of the redeemers in the absence of redemption 
(Rubin 1974).  However, the redemption decision is likely not random. Customers who have 
redeemed a reward might be more interested in the focal firm than non-redeemers.  As a result, 
the behavior of the two groups of customers would be different even in the absence of the reward 
redemption. Therefore, we first need to address the self-selection bias of the redemption 
decision.  
There are two approaches to address this self-selection bias. One approach is to use 
instrumental variables. To do this we would need to identify variables that affect the redemption 
decision, but are unrelated to ongoing customer search and purchase behavior. We believe that 
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identifying variables like these poses a significant challenge. Thus, finding a good instrument 
may not always be practical (Bound, Jeager, and Baker 1995; Hall, Rudebusch, and Wilcox 
1996). The second approach is to create a matched sample of non-redeemers who are similar to 
redeemers immediately before the redeemers choose to redeem a reward. In this approach one 
need to match customers in the two groups so that before redemption, there are no systematic 
differences between redeemers and non-redeemers. This is the same as randomizing group 
assignment in a natural experiment (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Rubin 1974; Rubin and 
Thomas 1996). 
Propensity score matching allows us to match redeemers and non-redeemers with similar 
characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, 1985). In this case, the propensity score is the 
probability of a customer redeeming a reward. Using this score we match each redeemer with a 
non-redeemer who has the closest propensity score to that redeemer. Matching based on 
propensity scores will create a sample of redeemers and non-redeemers for whom their 
characteristics have similar distributions at the baseline (i.e. right before redemption). 
Redemption decision. To build the sample, we first model the decision to redeem points for a 
reward. To do this we select a set of variables which are likely to influence a customer’s decision 
to redeem a reward at the focal firm: (1) the points a customer has obtained at the focal and 
competing firms, (2) the length of time a customer has been with the focal firm, and (3) the 
number of rewards that were available at each firm at the redemption time and how far a 
customer is from the minimum rewards. We estimate the probability of redemption with a 
logistic regression as follows: 
ijij5
4ij3ij2ij10ij
εewardDist_Min_Rβ
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        (1) 
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where Redeem is a binary variable which equals 1 for customers who redeemed a reward and 0 
for customers who did not redeem a reward at a given restaurant, Point is the point stock of 
customer i at the focal firm j at the time of redemption, Point_Other is the customer’s average 
point stock at other firms at the time of redemption, Tenure is the time (in weeks) since a 
customer has joined the app, Rewardk is the total number of rewards that are available at firm k 
at the time of redemption (k=1,..5), Dist_Min_Rewardij captures the distance between customer 
i's point stock at the firm with min reward available at the store at the time of redemption (the 
variable equal 0 if the customer has sufficient number of points to redeem the smallest available 
reward offered by that particular firm), and ε is the error term which is distributed extreme value.  
Propensity Score Matching. Once we obtained propensity scores from estimating Equation 1, 
we match each redeemer with a non-redeemer in the sample who has the closest propensity score 
to that redeemer. Our matching approach is nearest neighbor, one-to-one matching with no 
replacement (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). We also used caliper for the matching to limit the 
tolerance for the difference in propensity scores of redeemers with their closest match. Matching 
with caliper may reduce the sample size if there is no good match for a redeemer within the 
tolerance zone. However, it will also reduce the bias in matching (Austin 2011; Caliendo and 
Kopeinig 2008). 
After matching, we evaluate the quality of matching as follows. First, we run two-sample t-
tests on the mean value of the covariates in the redemption model (Eq. 1), to compare the mean 
values for redeemers and non-redeemers (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). Before matching, 
significant differences in mean values for the two groups is expected. However, after matching 
we expect no systematic difference in the mean values of covariates between the redeemer and 
non-redeemer groups. This will assure us that redeemer and non-redeemer customers in the 
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matched sample are not significantly different with regard to the factors that affect a customer’s 
probability of redeeming a reward.  
Second, we test that to what extent we were able to reduce the bias in the mean values of 
these variables between redeemers and non-redeemers, once we match the customers in these 
two groups. We calculate the percentage reduction in bias (PRB), proposed by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) as follows:  
XX
XX
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
 1                 (2) 
PRB compares the means of the explanatory variables in the redemption model (Eq. 1) for 
redeemers and non-redeemers before matching (𝑋𝑅
𝑃𝑟𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝑋𝑁
𝑃𝑟𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  respectively) and after matching 
(𝑋𝑅
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑋𝑁
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ respectively). A large PRB value shows a considerable reduction in bias once the 
customers in the two groups are matched. 
Once we build a matched sample with good quality at each firm, we can pool the samples 
across all six firms to perform our analysis of search and purchase behavior.   
Main Model Development 
 
We estimate the post redemption model for a period of 8 weeks after redemption. In the 
dataset, we observe customers’ search and purchase behavior for much longer than that (about 28 
weeks on average). However, we chose to investigate customer behavior for 8 weeks post-
redemption since the redemption effect may wear out as a customer’s memory of redemption 
fades over time. We consider customer behavior for 8 weeks after redemption which is close to 
the average inter-purchase time of all customers before redemption.  
For each individual i, we estimate two search models: search for promotions at the focal firm 
and average search for promotions across competing firms. A customer wants to search for 
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promotions when the utility of search is positive. Therefore, we do not observe positive search 
for all customers (i.e. censored at 0).  The limited dependent variable model is generally fitted 
using Tobit specification. To do this we run a random effects Tobit model on a customer’s search 
using the following equation:  
ε Firm_FETenureα  erAmount_Oth  α  Freq_Other α  Amount  α  
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     (3) 
where Search
j 
i,Post  is log of customer i’s number of search incidences for promotions 
(including rewards), at the focal firm post redemption, Redeemer is a binary variable with value 
= 1 if customer i is a redeemer and value = 0 if the customer has not redeemed a reward, Post 
indicates after redemption period and pre indicates before redemption period,  Freq is log of the 
average purchase frequency per week, and Amount is log of the average weekly purchase 
amount, at the focal firm. Similarly, Search_Other, Freq_Other, and Amount_Other capture 
customers’ average search and purchase across all other 5 firms, Tenure is the time (in weeks) 
since a customer has joined the app, Firm_FE are firms’ dummy variables that control for the 
heterogeneity among firms, and ε is the random error term.  Similarly, we estimate average 
search across all other 5 firms (Search_Other 
j
i,Post  ), using the same explanatory variables.  
Then, we estimate four models of purchase behavior: Purchase frequency and average 
weekly spending at the focal firm and on averages across other firms. The customer decides to 
whether to make a purchase when the utility of purchase is positive. Some customers make no 
purchase at the focal firm and/or across other firms during the 8-week post-redemption period. 
To accommodate partial observability of purchase behavior we run Tobit models, using the 
following equations:  
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where Amount 
j 
i,Post  is log of customer i’s average weekly spending at the focal firm after the 
redemption, Freq 
j 
i,Post  is log of is log of the average purchase frequency per week, Redeemer is 
a binary variable with value = 1 if customer i is a redeemer and value = 0 if the customer has not 
redeemed a reward, Post indicates after redemption period and pre indicates before redemption 
period, Search is log of the number of search incidences. Similarly, Search_Other, Freq_Other, 
and Amount_Other capture customers’ average search and purchase across all other 5 firms,  
Tenure is the time (in weeks) since a customer has joined the app, Firm_FE are firms’ dummy 
variables that control for the heterogeneity among firms, and ε is the random error term.  
Similarly, we can estimate average purchase frequency and purchase amount across all other 5 
firms (Freq_Other 
j 
i,Post , Amount_Other 
j 
i,Post , respectively), using the same set of explanatory 
variables . 
We note that while the data is structured in a way which only allows for 1 time period (post-
redemption), we still can have multiple observations per customer (focal and competing firms for 
each of the six firms). Thus, we estimate all of the models with random effects to control for 
potential unobserved customer heterogeneity. We estimate all six models jointly using CMP, a 
user-written procedure in STATA, which fits seemingly unrelated regression models with 
various response types, including Tobit as we have for this case at (Roodman 2011). This will 
help us to gain efficiency in our estimation by taking into account the potential correlation of 
error terms across search and purchase models at the focal and competing firms.   
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Results 
Propensity Score Matching  
 
In order to estimate propensity scores, we run a redemption model (Eq.1) at the firm level for 
all firms. The results for redemption model are presented in Table 3.2 (See Table 3.2). As shown 
in the table, across all six firms the number of points that a customer has accumulated at a firm 
has significant effect on that customer’s likelihood of redeeming a reward at that firm (p < .001). 
Average point stock across other firms is significant only at firm D (P<0.05). If a customer has 
accumulated more points across other firms, that customer is less likely to redeem a reward at 
firm D. However, this effect is non-significant for other 5 firms. Effect of tenure on redemption 
behavior is also non-significant across all six stores. 
 Note that some of the covariates have been dropped from models due to lack of variation in 
the value of that variable. For instance, consider the redemption model for firm B. At the time of 
redemption (or the expected time of redemption for non-redeemers) Firms C, D, E and F have 
already offered all of their reward options (2, 9, 5 and 4 reward options respectively). As a result, 
there is no variation in the number of rewards that are available at each firm across all customers. 
Therefore, these variables have no explanatory power and have been dropped from the model. 
Similarly, all customers had sufficient points to receive the minimum reward at Firm B at the 
time of redemption at Firm B. Therefore, the value of variable Distance_Min_Reward is 0 for all 
customers, and as a result this variable is dropped from the model.  
Once we obtained propensity scores from the redemption models in Table 3.2, we matched 
redeemers and non-redeemers based on their propensity scores as describe in the “Methodology” 
section. Next, we evaluated the quality of matching (See Table 3.3). Table 3.3 presents the mean 
values of the explanatory variables in redemption model (Eq. 1). Before matching, we see that 
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the mean values of the explanatory variables for redeemers and non-redeemers are considerably 
different for some variables, including point stock at the focal firms, average point stock across 
other firms and tenure. However, after matching the difference in mean values of covariates 
between redeemer and non-redeemer groups are much smaller and become non-significant for all 
covariates across all firms (p >0.01).  
Finally, Table 3.4 presents the percentage of reduction in bias (PRB) across all firms (See 
Table 3.4). As it is show in the table, there is considerable reduction in bias for most variables, 
specifically point stock at the focal firm, average point stock across other firms, and tenure. 
Note that PRB is not applicable when there is no variation in a variable across customers, 
before and after matching. For instance, as discussed earlier, Firms B, C, D, and E have already 
offered all of their reward options at the time of redemption, so there is no variation in the 
number of rewards that are available to different groups of customers. Also note that when the 
mean value for redeemers and non-redeemers were not significantly different before matching, 
PRB may not be a relevant measure. Because the two groups have similar values, the bias is 
already negligible before matching. In such case, a small change in the difference in mean values 
of the two groups after matching may have big, even negative impact on PRB. For instance, if 
the difference in means of point stocks is .1 before matching and becomes .3 after matching, the 
difference in mean values for the two groups is still statistically non-significant after matching. 
However, the percentage reduction in bias is -200%. Therefore, we apply PRB measure in cases 
where the mean value of a covariate is significantly different across the two groups before 
matching, so that matching can have a meaningful effect on reducing the bias in the mean value 
of an explanatory variable. For such variables, as it is shown in Table 3.4, matching has 
considerably reduced the bias, which indicates good matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). 
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Therefore, both evaluation approaches indicate good matching of redeemers with non-redeemers 
in the final sample used in the estimation of the main models. 
Hypothesis Testing  
 
Next, we discuss the results of our search and purchase models (Eq. 3 and 4). The results of 
the estimation for search behavior models (Eq. 3) are presented in Table 3.5 (See Table 3.5). 
Reward redemption has positive and significant impact on a customer’s future search at the focal 
firm (p < .001) and across other firms (p < .001).  
The results of the estimation for the purchase behavior models (Eq. 4) are presented in Table 
3.6 (See Table 3.6). The effect of redemption on a customer’s frequency and amount of purchase 
is positive and significant (p< .001). This suggests that a customer who redeems a reward at the 
focal firm is more likely to visit that firm more often and has higher spending post-redemption 
than a customer who has not redeemed any reward at the focal firm. The effect of redemption on 
customers' purchase behaviors across other stores is positive and statistically significant (p< 
.001). Customers who have redeemed a reward at the focal firm visit competing firms more often 
as compared to non-redeemers, and spend more on average. However, the magnitude of 
difference in purchase behavior between redeemers and non-redeemers across other firms is 
much smaller than the difference in their purchase behavior at the focal firm.  
Discussion  
 
The results of analysis show that redeeming a reward has significant effect on customer’s 
future search and purchase behavior at the focal firm and across competing firms. At the focal 
firm, redemption has a positive and significant effect on search behavior of redeemers, 
confirming H1a. This finding shows that obtaining a reward may increase a customer’s 
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sensitivity to promotions in general. Receiving a reward is a positive experience for a customer, 
so the customer may become more interested in reward options and search more often for 
potential rewards whether it is at the focal or competing firms. Regarding the purchase behavior, 
customers who redeem a reward visit the focal firm more frequently as compared to non-
redeemers, confirming H1b and H1c respectively. These results provide empirical support for the 
positive effect of rewarded behavior mechanism. The reinforcing effect of redemption on future 
purchase incidence and purchase amount is considerable. A customer that does not redeem a 
reward will purchase less frequently from the firm and may eventually discard the points that the 
customer has accumulated at that firm. In such case, the customer will not utilize the benefits of 
the reward program. These findings suggest that a firm can enhance the effectiveness of its 
reward program by encouraging customers to redeem the rewards they have already accumulated 
(Dorotic et al. 2014).  
Redeemers and non-redeemers also differ in their search and purchase behavior across 
competing firms. Customers who redeemed a reward at the focal firm search more across 
competing firms as compared to non-redeemers, confirming H2a. Those customers also visit 
competing firms more often, and have higher spending rate than customers who have not 
redeemed a reward yet, confirming H2b and H2c respectively. We argue that the depletion of 
point stock will decrease the point pressure effect at the focal firm. The customer no longer feels 
locked-in with that firm and can switch to another firm at a lower cost. This opens up an 
opportunity for variety seeking and exploring new options, at least for a short period post-
redemption. 
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Does Purchase Rate before Redemption Matter? 
 
Our analysis of customer search and purchase behavior showed that reward redemption plays 
an important role in customers' search and purchase behavior over time. Customers who redeem 
a reward at one firm have considerably higher purchase rate at that firm, as compared to 
customers who did not redeem any rewards. However, our analysis also showed that once a 
customer redeems a reward at the firm, the customer becomes more prone to the trial of 
competitors' offering and becomes more interested in rewards presented by the firm's 
competitors. Therefore, redeeming a reward can induce a customer behavior that is unfavorable 
to the focal firm. An important and relevant managerial question is how different groups of 
customers might behave differently after redeeming a reward.  
In order to answer this question, we ran an exploratory analysis of redeemers’ purchase and 
search behavior to investigate the effect on reward redemption on customer behavior. Here we 
only focus on redeemers in our sample. We see two different patterns of purchase among these 
customers prior to reward redemption. One group of customers makes frequent purchases and 
accumulate points at much higher pace. They also search more for promotions offered by the 
firm. The other group of customers makes less frequent purchase and it takes them longer to 
accumulate points before making a redemption. We classify customers as heavy and light users 
respectively, based on their pre-redemption purchase behavior. Customers with average weekly 
spending below the median were classified as light users and those with the above median 
spending were coded as heavy users. The pre- and post- purchase and search behavior of these 
two groups is summarized in Table 3.7 (See Table 3.7). 
Prior to redeeming a reward, heavy users visit the store more often and accumulate points 
much faster than light users. They also redeem a reward much earlier, after about 11.6 weeks 
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since they become a program member. For light users, it takes about 38 weeks to accumulate 
points before redeeming a reward. However, both groups spend about 60% of the points they 
have accumulated to redeem a reward.  
Based on the pre-redemption purchase patterns it seems that heavy users are more loyal to 
the firm, and therefore a better target for receiving rewards from the firm. However, the purchase 
level of heavy users drops considerably after redemption ($6.96 decrease in average spending 
post-redemption). On the other hand, average spending of light users did not change significantly 
after redemption (only $.05 decrease in average spending per week post-redemption). These 
results show that receiving a reward has different effects on heavy and light users, and this 
difference is statistically significant (t-value=7.38; p<0.01). There are also differences in 
purchase frequency of heavy and light users. After redeeming a reward heavy users visit the store 
less often compared to their pre-redemption period (0.56 decrease in average purchase frequency 
per week post-redemption). However, light users visit the store as frequently as they did before 
redemption. The difference in average purchase frequency, pre- and post-redemption is 
statistically significant across heavy and light users (t-value=7.59; p<0.01). Figure 3.2a and 3.2b 
depicts the pre-and post-redemption purchase behavior of the two groups (See Figure 3.2a and 
3.2b) 
Point-pressure and reward-behavior effects a customer experiences can vary based on 
customers’ redemption behavior. There is heterogeneity in number of points customers have at 
the time of redemption, and what rewards they choose to redeem. Redeeming a large reward 
depletes a customer’s point stock more than redeeming a small reward. The portion of points left 
after redemption may impact a customer’s decision about future purchases. However, receiving a 
large gift can induce greater rewarded behavior effect, which in turn leads to higher sense of 
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appreciation and loyalty toward the firm (Bolton, Kannan, and Bramlett 2000; Taylor and Neslin 
2005). In our sample both heavy and light users’ groups on average redeem about 60% of their 
accumulated points. Therefore the point-pressure effect for future redemption opportunities 
seems to be similar across the two groups. On the other hand, light users receive smaller gifts on 
average as compared to heavy users (average reward size of 34.7 points for light users and 45.6 
points for heavy users). Even though both groups feel the same level of point pressure effect for 
future redemption opportunities, it seems that redeeming a reward, even a much smaller reward, 
has higher positive impact on light customers as compared to heavy customers. Therefore, 
reward redemption can induce more positive change in the behavior of light users. 
These findings are consistent with previous studies. For instance, Wansink’s (2003) conjoint 
survey of brand managers and customers show that brand managers usually prefer to focus their 
loyalty programs on heavy users. However, loyalty programs that target light users can generate 
higher potential incremental sales. In addition, two separate studies of free ham and turkey 
reward programs at grocery stores reveal that rewards lead to higher increase in spending by 
causal shoppers who have lower purchase baseline (Lal and Bell 2003; Taylor and  Neslin 2005). 
Finally, Liu’s (2007) study of a convince store franchise shows that loyalty program does not 
change the behavior of heavy users; however it makes light users to purchase more over time and 
become more loyal to the firm. 
Implications to Theory and Practice 
Implications to Theory 
 
Our study aims to better understanding of a customer usage of loyalty program (i.e. reward 
redemption) across firms. We show that reward redemption at one firm has positive impact on 
that customer’s future search and purchase at the firm. This finding provides empirical support 
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for the reinforcing effect of the rewarded behavior mechanism (Dorotic et al. 2014; Lewis 2004; 
Drèze and Nunes 2011; Taylor and Neslin 2005). We also show that reward redemption at the 
focal firm has signifcant effect on the customer’s future search and purchase behavior across 
competing firms. In other words, our study reveals that there is a spillover effect in a customer’s 
behavior across loyalty programs across firms. This has significant implication to theory. It is 
impossible to demonstrate the cross-firm effect of reward redemption without observing a 
customer’s purchase and redemption behavior across firms. Our novel dataset allows us to 
observe a customer’s interaction across competing firms, and therefore we could provide 
evidence for the cross-firm effect of reward redemption. Our analysis shows that redemption of 
reward decreases point pressure effect, and consequently increases purchase across other firms.   
Implications to Practice 
 
From the practical standpoint, the findings from of our study can help guide the design of 
loyalty programs and reward thresholds. Some firms set a high threshold for rewards, so that a 
customer has to spend higher amount to become eligible for a reward. However, our empirical 
analysis shows that once a customer redeems a reward at a given firm, that customer revisits the 
firm more often and spends more on average as compared to a customer who has not redeemed 
any reward. A customer that does not redeem a reward may eventually discard the points and 
switch to a competitor that offers more attractive reward options. Thus, stimulating reward 
redemption is a means to enhance customer loyalty. 
The rewarded behavior effect reinforces future purchase. However, redemption of a reward 
weakens the point pressure effect. In the absence of point pressure, we empirically show that a 
customer is more likely to search for and try products from competitors. Thus, managers need to 
consider this trade-offs between rewarded behavior effect and point pressure effect when 
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designing and implementing a loyalty reward program. The reward program needs to be 
designed in a way that enhances rewarded behavior effect, while having a mechanism in place to 
minimize the negative effect of point pressure reduction post-redemption.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 
We do acknowledge the limitations of our study. Our study is conducted using firms in the 
restaurant industry. This may limit the generalizability of the findings of the study to other 
industries. For instance in some industries, the rewarded behavior effect may have less impact on 
future customer purchase behavior when customers make infrequent and large purchases (e.g. 
airline industry). This might also lead to a more significant point pressure effect given the high 
point redemption levels (e.g. a free flight). Even though the context of our study is with firms 
with high frequency lower value transactions, we believe the key takeaways of our study will 
likely hold, i.e. firms need to pay attention to the trade-off between the point pressure effect and 
rewarded behavior effect when creating and implementing a loyalty program in a competitive 
market.  
We also did not consider the impact of price and product variety on customer choice. We 
purposefully focused on restaurants that offer fairly similar menu at a close price range, so that 
customer price sensitivity and variety seeking do not confound the findings of our study. Future 
studies should consider how price and product variety among competing firms might impact a 
customer’s search and purchase behavior across firms. 
There are some additional avenues to pursue for future research.  First, it is important to 
incorporate a larger sample which includes more firms and customers to improve the reliability 
of our findings. As a robustness check, it is important to replicate the study in other geographic 
markets. Second, future research could investigate how customer heterogeneity may affect 
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customer responsiveness to reward redemption. Prior research has shown that different segments 
(e.g. light vs. heavy users, price-oriented vs. service-oriented) respond differently to reward 
programs (Bell and Lal 2003, Kopalle et al. 2012; Taylor and Neslin 2005). It would be 
insightful to see if there are significant differences in the search and purchase behavior of 
different segments across other firms as well, both pre- and post-redemption. 
In summary, the contribution of our study is threefold. First, we investigate the effect of 
reward redemption on a customer behavior at the focal firm, controlling for that customer’s 
interaction across competing firms. We empirically show that rewarded behavior mechanism has 
significant reinforcing effect on the customer’s future search and purchase at the focal firm. 
Second, we show that the customer’s reward redemption at the focal firm spills over onto that 
customer’s search and purchase behavior across competing firms. To our knowledge, this is the 
first study that looks at the cross-firm effect of reward redemption, a key contribution to the 
marketing literature. Third, our analysis of redeemers’ post-redemption behavior reveals that 
redeeming a reward has much more positive effect on light users as compared to heavy users. 
This finding suggests that in order to increase the return on investment in loyalty programs, firms 
should not focus their reward programs solely on their most frequent customers. Rewarding the 
less frequent customers seems to provide higher return for firm and leads to greater behavioral 
change for customers.  
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TABLE 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable 
Redeemers Non-redeemers  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Customer Behavior   
  
    
Number of Transactions (per month) 2.49 2.61 0.55 0.99 
Spending  (per month)  19.56 17.73 5.30 7.25 
Search (per month) 0.26 0.45 0.06 0.18 
Redemption 
    
Redeemer (%) 34% NA 66% NA 
Point Stock (at time of redemption)
 *
 77.07 47.79 23.66 21.53 
Average Point Stock at Other Firms (at 
time of redemption)
 *
 
4.42 11.57 3.39 8.98 
Control Variable 
    
Tenure (in months at time of redemption)
* 
6.35 4.98 7.01 4.69 
                  *
 for non-redeemers, expected redemption time is used as time of redemption 
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TABLE 3.2: Results of redemption models 
Variables  
Business A Business B Business C Business D Business E Business F 
Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.) 
Coeff. (Std. 
Err.) 
Intercept 1.970 (2.397) -2.054 (0.914) * -3.969 (1.263) ** -1.446 (1.449) -2.054 (0.914) * -0.571 (1.852) 
Point_Stock 0.050 (0.005) *** 0.035 (0.006) *** 0.044 (0.007) *** 0.047 (0.008) *** 0.035 (0.006) *** 0.038 
(0.005) 
*** 
Point_Stovck_Other 0.008 (0.024) 0.019 (0.013) -0.017 (0.019) -0.037 (0.015) * 0.019 (0.013) -0.010 (0.013) 
Tenure (weeks) 0.003 (0.005)  -0.014 (0.011) 0.008 (0.011) 0.007 (0.010)  -0.004 (0.008) 0.007 (0.007) 
Biz A_Rewards 0.051 (0.424) -0.210 (0.430) -0.356 (0.606) -0.095 (0.682) -0.210 (0.430) -1.163 (0.428) ** 
Biz B_Rewards -0.230 (0.065) *** 0.063 (0.079) -a  -0.329 (0.130) * 0.063 (0.079) -0.117 (0.083) 
Biz C_Rewards 0.025 (0.525) -a  -a  -a  -a  -0.197 (0.886) 
Biz D_Rewards 0.088 (0.146) -a  -a  -a  -a  -a  
Biz E_Rewards -1.220 (0.445) ** -a  -a  -a  -a  -a  
Biz F_Rewards -a  -a  -a  -a  -a  -a  
Distance_Min_Reward -0.113 (0.062) -a  -a  -a  -a  -a  
     a 
There is no variation in this variable across all customers, and therefore this variable is dropped from the equation.  
    * Significant at p-value < 0.05; ** Significant at p-value < 0.01; *** Significant at p-value < 0. 
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TABLE 3.3: Means of covariates in matched vs. unmatched samples 
Business A 
Covariates 
Unmatched  Matched  
Non-redeemer 
(N=539 ) 
Redeemer 
(N= 215 ) 
Non-redeemer  
(N= 150) 
Redeemer  
(N= 150 ) 
Point 27.86 73.45 53.60 59.70 
Point_Other Firms 1.59 2.52 2.55 2.76 
Tenure (Weeks) 29.15 29.72 28.76 30.60 
Biz A_Rewards 2.05 2.10 2.05 2.04 
Biz B_Rewards 2.95 2.36 2.61 2.61 
Biz C_Rewards 1.82 1.76 1.87 1.89 
Biz D_Rewards 8.32 8.08 8.52 8.64 
Biz E_Rewards 4.99 4.68 4.96 4.99 
Biz F_Rewards 4 3.94 4 4 
Biz A_Distance Min Reward 3.84 0 0.09 0 
Biz B_Distance Min Reward 9.44 9.13 9.43 9.06 
Biz C_Distance Min Reward 14.11 13.75 13.97 14.09 
Biz D_Distance Min Reward 19.51 17.48 19.15 17.61 
Biz E_Distance Min Reward 9.19 9.07 9.08 9.04 
Biz F_Distance Min Reward 13.36 14.92 14.17 13.98 
 
Business B 
Covariates 
Unmatched  Matched  
Non-redeemer 
(N=262 ) 
Redeemer 
(N= 101 ) 
Non-redeemer  
(N= 53) 
Redeemer  
(N= 53 ) 
Point 21.23 71.98 44.81 52.09 
Point_Other Firms 3.55 1.87 4.05 2.36 
Tenure (Weeks) 26.38 20.22 19.74 20.27 
Biz A_Rewards 2.06 1.98 2.04 2.02 
Biz B_Rewards 4 4 4 4 
Biz C_Rewards 2 2 2 2 
Biz D_Rewards 9 9 9 9 
Biz E_Rewards 5 5 5 5 
Biz F_Rewards 4 4 4 4 
Biz A_Distance Min Reward 11.55 14.62 9.68 13.57 
Biz B_Distance Min Reward 0.75 0 0 0 
Biz C_Distance Min Reward 13.49 14.36 13.26 13.78 
Biz D_Distance Min Reward 19.36 20.05 19.37 20.38 
Biz E_Distance Min Reward 9.32 9.60 9.81 9.62 
Biz F_Distance Min Reward 9.39 9.50 9.06 9.43 
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Business C 
Covariates 
Unmatched  Matched  
Non-redeemer 
(N=269 ) 
Redeemer 
(N= 65 ) 
Non-redeemer  
(N= 46) 
Redeemer  
(N= 46 ) 
Point 29.23 100.16 70.65 84.83 
Point_Other Firms 4.26 4.58 3.99 3.66 
Tenure (Weeks) 33.66 30.34 31.39 32.54 
Biz A_Rewards 1.94 2.00 1.96 1.96 
Biz B_Rewards 4 3.38 4 4 
Biz C_Rewards 2 2 2 2 
Biz D_Rewards 9 9 9 9 
Biz E_Rewards 5 5 5 5 
Biz F_Rewards 4 4 4 4 
Biz A_Distance Min Reward 15.27 15.63 15.07 14.90 
Biz B_Distance Min Reward 9.48 8.92 9.58 8.92 
Biz C_Distance Min Reward 2.07 0 0 0 
Biz D_Distance Min Reward 19.32 20.12 19.63 20.21 
Biz E_Distance Min Reward 9.18 9.23 8.32 9.13 
Biz F_Distance Min Reward 9.22 10.78 8.71 8.27 
 
Business D 
Covariates 
Unmatched  Matched  
Non-redeemer 
(N=291 ) 
Redeemer 
(N= 103 ) 
Non-redeemer  
(N=57) 
Redeemer  
(N=57) 
Point 18.51 83.08 47.10 54.61 
Point_Other Firms 5.37 8.22 6.70 5.55 
Tenure (Weeks) 29.02 26.14 28.05 26.72 
Biz A_Rewards 1.98 2.00 1.98 2.00 
Biz B_Rewards 3.51 2.91 3.37 3.37 
Biz C_Rewards 2 2 2 2 
Biz D_Rewards 9 9 9 9 
Biz E_Rewards 5 5 5 5 
Biz F_Rewards 4 4 4 4 
Biz A_Distance Min Reward 13.18 13.51 10.53 11.52 
Biz B_Distance Min Reward 9.41 9.33 9.27 9.17 
Biz C_Distance Min Reward 14.18 14.19 13.94 13.98 
Biz D_Distance Min Reward 8.02 0 0 0 
Biz E_Distance Min Reward 8.59 8.28 9.17 8.21 
Biz F_Distance Min Reward 11.10 13.50 11.41 12.02 
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Business E  
Covariates 
Unmatched  Matched  
Non-redeemer 
(N=323) 
Redeemer 
(N=110) 
Non-redeemer  
(N=87) 
Redeemer  
(N=87) 
Point 18.61 69.56 38.92 46.05 
Point_Other Firms 2.90 4.40 4.89 5.46 
Tenure (Weeks) 22.87 19.60 19.61 20.91 
Biz A_Rewards 1.98 1.98 1.94 1.98 
Biz B_Rewards 2.76 2.40 2.85 2.71 
Biz C_Rewards 2 1.85 2 2 
Biz D_Rewards 9 8.51 9 9 
Biz E_Rewards 5 4.98 5 5 
Biz F_Rewards 4 4 4 4 
Biz A_Distance Min Reward 18.07 17.81 17.09 15.59 
Biz B_Distance Min Reward 9.53 9.30 9.22 9.21 
Biz C_Distance Min Reward 14.12 15.00 13.90 15.00 
Biz D_Distance Min Reward 19.36 18.94 18.62 18.68 
Biz E_Distance Min Reward 1.70 0 0 0 
Biz F_Distance Min Reward 13.84 15.23 13.28 14.25 
 
Business F 
Covariates 
Unmatched  Matched  
Non-redeemer 
(N=280 ) 
Redeemer 
(N= 165 ) 
Non-redeemer  
(N= 111) 
Redeemer  
(N= 111 ) 
Point 41.01 98.96 64.08 72.53 
Point_Other Firms 3.00 3.44 3.28 3.23 
Tenure (Weeks) 27.18 24.54 26.79 26.83 
Biz A_Rewards 2.03 2.01 1.99 1.97 
Biz B_Rewards 3.26 2.88 3.17 3.17 
Biz C_Rewards 1.99 1.84 1.98 1.98 
Biz D_Rewards 9 8.35 9 9 
Biz E_Rewards 5 4.84 5 5 
Biz F_Rewards 4 4 4 4 
Biz A_Distance Min Reward 15.14 17.38 16.54 17.17 
Biz B_Distance Min Reward 9.50 9.52 8.98 9.65 
Biz C_Distance Min Reward 13.92 14.40 13.62 14.50 
Biz D_Distance Min Reward 20.03 20.40 19.59 20.55 
Biz E_Distance Min Reward 9.50 9.45 9.16 9.65 
Biz F_Distance Min Reward 0.56 0 0 0 
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TABLE 3.4: Percentage reduction in bias (PRB) after matching 
Covariates  
Percentage Reduction in Bias (%) 
Business A Business B Business C Business D Business E Business F 
Point 86.7 83.7 77.7 81.8 84.1 84.4 
Point_Other 77.7 12.1 c 45.3 c  -71.2 c 63.9 92.5 
Tenure (Weeks) -19.1 c 91.8 -93.5 c -705 c -38.2 c 96.7 
Biz A_Rewards 72.2 74.9 100 55 -161.6
 c 67.4 
Biz B_Rewards 100 .
 a . b 100 -143.8 c 100 
Biz C_Rewards 31.4
 c . a . a . a . b 100 
Biz D_Rewards 1.6
 c . a . a . a . b . b 
Biz E_Rewards 88.8 .
 a . a . a . b . b 
Biz F_Rewards .
 b . a . a . a . a . a 
Distance Min Reward 95.4 .
 b . b . b . b . b 
       a The variable has similar value for all customers before matching (zero variance)  
       b 
The variable has similar value for all customers once matched (zero variance)  
       c 
The mean value for redeemers and non-redeemers were not significantly different before matching.  
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TABLE 3.5: Results for search behavior model 
Search Behavior 
Search for 
 Promotions 
Search for 
 Promotions 
Own-effect Cross-effect 
Variables  Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.) 
Intercept -0.500 (0.131)
 ***
 -0.602 (0.151)
 ***
 
Redeemer 0.365 (0.058)
 ***
 0.210 (0.052)
 ***
 
Purchase Behavior 
Freq Pre -0.110 (0.111) -0.010 (0.153) 
Freq_Other Pre -0.244 (0.152) 0.042 (0.119) 
Spending Pre -0.069 (0.057) -0.162 (0.067)
 *
 
Spending_Other Pre 0.079 (0.043) 0.186 (0.042)
 ***
 
Search Behavior         
Search_Promo Pre 0.808 (0.116)
 ***
 0.221 (0.177) 
Search_Promo_Other Pre -0.112 (0.173) 0.209 (0.180) 
Control Variables 
Tenure -0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included 
Model Fit
 a
  
Log Likelihood 
-1,318.3428     
            * Significant at p-value < 0.05; ** Significant at p-value < 0.01; *** Significant at p-value < 0. 
                       
a  
Model fit for joint estimation of all 6 models (search and purchase) 
 
 
 
99 
 
TABLE 3.6: Results for purchase behavior models 
Purchase Behavior 
Purchase Frequency  Spending  Purchase Frequency  Spending  
Own-effect Own-effect Cross-effect Cross-effect 
Variables  Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.) 
Intercept -0.192 (0.084)
 *
 -1.067 (0.276)
 ***
 -0.105 (0.045)
 *
 -1.794 (0.424)
 ***
 
Redeemer 0.315 (0.032)
 ***
 0.965 (0.104)
 ***
 0.122 (0.017)
 ***
 0.668 (0.155)
 ***
 
Purchase Behavior  
Freq Pre 0.567 (0.074)
 ***
 0.282 (0.244)   0.083 (0.040)
 *
 0.180 (0.379) 
Freq_Other Pre -0.095 (0.105) 0.236 (0.288) 0.445 (0.052)
 ***
 0.572 (0.415) 
Spending Pre -0.126 (0.038)
 ***
 -0.018 (0.120) -0.050 (0.021)
 *
 -0.293 (0.187) 
Spending_Other Pre 0.003 (0.031) 0.359 (0.094)
 ***
 0.015 (0.016) 1.095 (0.143)
 ***
 
Search Behavior                 
Search_Promo Post -0.264 (0.222) -0.571 (0.732) -0.116 (0.140) -0.606 (1.115) 
Search_Promo_Other Post 0.637 (0.445) -0.870 (1.148) 0.864 (0.180)
 ***
 -2.997 (1.439)
 *
 
Control Variables 
Tenure -0.002 (0.001) -0.003 (0.004) -0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
Model Fit
a
  
Log Likelihood  
-1,318.3428     
                * Significant at p-value < 0.05; ** Significant at p-value < 0.01; *** Significant at p-value < 0.001 
                        a  
Model fit for joint estimation of all 6 models (search and purchase)  
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TABLE 3.7: Purchase and search behavior of redeemers 
  Light Users  Heavy Users  Total Sample  
Sample Size  251 253 504 
Purchase Behavior        
Spending, Pre-redemption  1.78 11.91 6.86 
Spending, Post-redemption  1.73 4.95 3.35 
Mean Difference Test  Diff= -6.91, t=-7.38 
Purchase Frequency, Pre-redemption  .21 1.06 .63 
Purchase Frequency, Post-redemption  .20 .5 .35 
Mean Difference Test  Diff=-.56, t=-7.59 
Search Behavior  
Search, Pre-redemption  .04 .15 .09 
Search, Post redemption  .02 .04 0.3 
Mean Difference Test  Diff=-.08, t=-3.88 
Redemption Behavior    
Time to redeem a reward (weeks)  38.0 11.6 24.8 
Point Stock at Time of Redemption  52.44 73.30 62.87 
Reward Size  34.70 45.64 40.17 
Redemption Ratio (% points redeemed)  0.65 0.62 0.64 
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Figure 3.1a: Model free evidence: average inter-purchase time at the focal firm in weeks 
(SD) before and after redemption 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1b: Model free evidence: average inter-purchase time at other firms in weeks (SD) 
before and after redemption 
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Figure 3.2a Average purchase frequency per week, before and after redemption 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2b: Average spending per week, before and after redemption 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, the two essays in this dissertation have been designed to examine different 
aspects of relationship marketing that has not been thoroughly investigated previously. In the 
first essay (see Chapter 2), I argue that breadth of relationship has significant impact on 
relationship’s outcomes. In a non-profit setting, I empirically show that donors who develop a 
broader relationship with a non-profit are more valuable to that non-profit over time. They have 
higher future value for the organization, have lower volatility in their relationships with the 
organization and are more responsive to marketing communications. I also show that the 
proposed measure of relationship breadth is better able to capture the variation in giving amount 
and more accurately predicts the expected giving amount (both in-sample and out-of-sample) 
than the measure of cross-donation (i.e. number of causes a donor supports).This finding 
contributes to the literature on measurements of the breadth of customer relationships. It suggests 
that measures such as cross-buy (i.e. number of product categories purchase), commonly used in 
the customer relationship management literature to measure the breadth of a relationship, could 
be enhanced by also capturing the distribution of purchases. 
In addition, in Essay 1 I show that drivers of relationship change over the donor life cycle. At 
the acquisition phase, intrinsic factors drive the breadth of relationship, while at the retention 
phase extrinsic factors have higher impact on driving the breadth of relationship. Based on these 
findings, I recommend that at the acquisition phase, nonprofit organizations should align donors 
with causes that are “close to the heart”. Later at the retention phase, marketing efforts should be 
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focused on encouraging donors to increase the breadth of their relationship with the organization 
by giving to additional causes. Finally, the field study conducted at the focal nonprofit provides 
causal evidence that marketing communications can motivate donors to broaden their 
relationships with the organization. 
In the second essay (see Chapter 3) I focus on reward programs, which are one of the most 
common relationship marketing strategies across industries. I investigate the effect of reward 
redemption on a customer behavior at a firm, controlling for that customer’s relationship across 
competing firms. I empirically show that customer’s reward redemption at a firm not only affects 
customer’s future search and purchase at the focal form, but the redemption effect also spills 
over onto that customer’s search and purchase behavior across competing firms. In addition, my 
analysis of post-redemption behavior of customers shows that return on investment on 
relationship marketing is not higher for best, most loyal customers. For light users it takes more 
time to accumulate points to redeem a reward. However, reward redemption has much more 
positive effect on light users as compared to heavy user. This finding suggest that a firm might 
benefit more from its reward program if it encourages light users to redeem a reward sooner and 
delay the redemption for heavy users, or offer them higher reward options.  
I hope that this dissertation inspires future studies on relationship marketing, and can help 
researchers and practitioners to better understand drivers of relationship marketing and its 
impacts on customer behavior in a competitive environment. 
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APPENDIX 2.A: REVIEW OF SIMILAR STUDIES 
 
Study 
Empirical 
Analysis 
Drivers and Consequences of Targeted 
Giving Key Insights 
Drivers Consequences 
Null (2011) Experiments 
Warm glow utility,          
Risk aversion 
Inefficient charitable 
giving 
Most subjects simultaneously gave to multiple charities with similar missions even 
when the social benefits of gifts to different charities were not equal. Warm glow 
and risk aversion both seem to be important determinants of the inefficiencies that 
arise from donors' choices about which charities to support. 
Bennett 
(2012) 
Survey 
Emotional satisfaction; 
Intrinsic need for variation; 
Cognitive Balance 
X 
Donors who gave to organizations within the same sector gained less emotional 
benefit from donating to the second charity than they obtained from giving to the 
main charity. Innate desire for variation and the desire to obtain cognitive balance 
significantly influences the likelihood that a person’s main and second charities 
would be in different sectors. 
Robinson et 
al. (2012) 
Experiments  
& Field Study 
Customer Collectivism;  
Perceptual fit between 
company and a cause;  
Perception of personal role 
Willingness to pay 
for a product 
associated with a 
cause 
The positive effect of allowing consumers to select the cause in a CM campaign on 
consumer reactions to products associated with CM campaigns is moderated by 
customer collectivism and perceptual fit between company and a cause, and is 
mediated by enhanced perceptions of personal role in helping the cause.  
Ly & Mason 
(2012) 
Secondary 
data 
(Aggregate 
level) 
X X 
Authors presents evidence on the relative popularity of competing development 
projects on Kiva.org 
Li et al. 
(2013)   
working paper 
Experiments X 
Likelihood and 
Amount of gifts 
For both government and private charities, the amount of voluntary contributions 
and the likelihood of voluntarily giving are significantly higher for organizations 
with targeted causes than to general funds. The impact of targeting is significantly 
greater for government organizations. 
Batista et al. 
(2013)      
working paper 
Experiment X Amount of gift 
Utility of givers depends on the composition (not just the level) of gift-recipient 
expenditures, and givers thus seek control over transferred resources. Dictators share 
more with counterparts when they have the option of giving in kind (in the form of 
goods), compared to giving that must be in cash. 
Eckel et al. 
(2014)    
working paper 
Field Study X Amount of gift 
While there is no effect on the probability of giving, donations are significantly 
larger when there is the option of directing 
This study 
Secondary 
data (Donor 
level)  &  Field 
Study 
Intrinsic and  Extrinsic 
motivators 
Likelihood and 
Amount of gifts 
Giving to multiple causes in the past (higher Donation Variety) increases the 
likelihood the donor makes a subsequent donation and on average donation amount 
would be higher and sensitivity to negative macroeconomic shocks would be lower. 
In the acquisition phase, most donors give to a single initiative and the decision is 
influenced more by a donor’s intrinsic motivation. In The retention phase, nonprofit 
marketing efforts have a more significant influence on a donor’s decision to give to 
multiple initiatives. 
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APPENDIX 2.B: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE MODEL AND ESTIMATION 
To empirically test our hypotheses, we first control for the endogeneity of marketing efforts 
using instrumental variables. We need to identify at least two instrumental variables which are 
likely to impact the nonprofit organization’s decision to expend marketing efforts, but unlikely to 
impact a given donor’s expected gift amount. We identify two instrumental variables we believe 
are related to the level of marketing efforts, but unrelated to gift amount: (1) Total budget for 
personal marketing efforts and (2) Total budget for impersonal marketing efforts. We expect that 
that increases (decreases) in the marketing budget is likely to lead to increases (decreases) in 
average spending levels across donors, but unlikely to improve the targeting of the marketing 
efforts to specific donors which increase gift amount. Thus, we believe that these two variables 
will act as good instruments to handle the potential endogeneity problem inherent in the strategic 
allocation of marketing efforts. We also include a donor’s past giving amount and time since 
graduation (not instruments since they is also included in the main equation) and interactions 
between the instruments and past giving amount and time since graduation as we expect these 
will impact the amount of marketing efforts expended by the university foundation. 
We estimate the instrumental variable model for both personal and impersonal marketing efforts 
and use a control function approach (Petrin and Train 2010) to include marketing efforts (both 
personal and impersonal) into the next step of analysis, along with the computed error from the 
instrumental variable equations. This model takes the following format: 
t1i,i11ti,t8t7
1ti,t61ti,t5
1ti,41ti,3t`2t`10ti,
εcTSG)Budgln(ImpMktgαc)Budgln(ImpMktgα
TSG)Budgln(PerMktgα)ln(Gift)Budgln(PerMktgα
TSG α)ln(Giftα)Budgln(ImpMktgα)Budgln(PerMktgααPerMktg






 (B1) 
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t2i,i21ti,t81ti,t7
1ti,t61ti,t5
1ti,41ti,3t2t10
ti,
εcTSG)Budgln(ImpMktgβ)ln(Gift)Budgln(ImpMktgβ
TSG)Budgln(PerMktgβ)ln(Gift)Budgln(PerMktgβ
TSG β)ln(Giftβ)Budgln(ImpMktgβ)Budgln(PerMktgββ
ImpMktg







(B2) 
where PerMktgi,t (ImpMktgi,t) is the marketing expenditure on personal (impersonal) 
marketing efforts for donor i at time t, ln(PerMktgBudgt) (ln(ImpMktgBudgt)) is the log of the 
total marketing budget used for personal (impersonal) marketing efforts by the nonprofit 
foundation in time t, ln(Gifti,t-1) is the log of the gift amount given by donor i at time t-1, TSGi,t-1 
is the time since graduation by donor i up to time t-1, ci1 and ci2 are random effects which control 
for the unobserved heterogeneity of donor i, and εi,t1, εi,t2 are random error terms. We estimate 
the model for both personal and impersonal marketing efforts using a random effects linear 
regression and use the control function approach to include marketing efforts into the next step 
of analysis (i.e. using the computed error terms and from the marketing expenditure models 
along with the actual marketing expenditure values). As a robustness check we also estimate the 
main model of expected donation amount on the 2 instrumental variables. We find that the 2 
instruments are unrelated to expected giving. This makes them useful instrumental variables for 
our modeling framework.  
Robustness Checks 
There are two general conditions by which you can test the quality of your instruments in 
your instrumental variable regression. First, you want your instruments to be partially correlated 
with the endogenous variables, in this case impersonal and personal marketing efforts. To do this 
we estimate the instrumental variable regressions (see Table 2.B1). 
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TABLE 2.B1: Results for the instrumental variable models 
Variable 
DV = PerMktgit 
Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
DV = ImpMktgit 
Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Intercept 1.562 (0.516)
*
 0.433 (0.069)
 *
 
ln(PerMktgBudgt) 0.281 (0.027)
*
 0.351 (0.036)
*
 
ln(ImpMktgBudgt) -0.781 (0.768) 1.314 (0.112)
*
 
ln(Gifti,t-1) 0.338 (0.092)
*
 0.038 (0.011)
*
 
Tenurei,t-1 0.032 (0.096) 0.010 (0.002)
*
 
ln(PerMktgBudgt) * ln(Gifti,t-1) 0.550 (0.066)
*
 0.045 (0.010)
*
 
ln(ImpMktgBudgt) * ln(Gifti,t-1) 0.102 (0.135) 0.082 (0.020)
*
 
ln(PerMktgBudgt) * Tenurei,t-1 0.062 (0.005)
*
 -0.038 (0.008)
*
 
ln(ImpMktgBudgt) * Tenurei,t-1 -0.011 (0.075) 0.073 (0.011)
*
 
Model Fit (R
2
) 0.286 0.593 
           * Significant at p-value < 0.01 
 
We can see from Table 2.B1 that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
marketing effort variables (i.e. they are significant predictors of impersonal and personal 
marketing efforts). Specifically, we find as the marketing budget increases, donors receive more 
personal and impersonal marketing efforts from the foundation. However, personal marketing is 
based mainly on donors who gave larger gifts in the past, while impersonal marketing is based 
mainly on a donor’s time since graduation. While the personal marketing budget only affects 
personal marketing, impersonal marketing is affected by both personal and impersonal marketing 
budgets. A possible explanation is that a greater portion of a marketing budget is devoted to 
personal marketing, which is more costly as compared to impersonal marketing, but it is aimed at 
potential future major donors who are likely to make gifts of larger value. Once the foundation 
takes care of its major contributors, the rest of marketing budget will be allocated to impersonal 
marketing efforts. Both the personal and impersonal marketing instrumental variable models 
show a reasonable fit (R2 is 0.286 and 0.593 for personal and impersonal marketing models 
respectively). Second, you want the instruments to be generally unrelated to the main outcome 
variable. It is not straightforward in this case to run a simple correlation between two instruments 
(Personal Marketing Budget, Impersonal Marketing Budget, and Tenure) and the outcome 
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variables of interest (Donation Variety and Donation Amount). This is due to the fact that the 
main outcome variables are both censored at 0. Thus, to test whether the instruments are related 
to the outcome variable of interest, we do the following. We use the same dynamic panel 
estimation procedure as is described in the main paper to estimate a model with only the lag of 
the dependent variable and the variables from the instrumental variable regressions. We start by 
estimating the model for Donation Amount (see Table 2.B2). 
We see from Table 2.B2 that the lag of the dependent variable is significant in this 
estimation. Further, we see that the interaction between the lag of the dependent variable and the 
two marketing budget variables are significant in the main equation. We also see that that 
interaction between the variable time since graduation and the two marketing budget variables 
are significant across both equations. However, we see that two instrumental variables are not 
significant in either equation and the interaction between the two instrumental variables and the 
lag of the dependent variable are not significant in the selection equation. This provides some 
empirical evidence that the instruments of Personal Marketing Budget and Impersonal Marketing 
Budget are good instruments for the Donation Amount model. 
 
TABLE 2.B2: Instrumental variables regressed on donation amount 
Variables (DV = Donation 
Amount) 
Selection 
Coeff. (Std. Err.) 
Main  
Coeff. (Std. Err.) 
Intercept 0.411 (0.033)
*
 2.918 (0.039)
*
 
ln(Gifti,t-1) 0.214 (0.003)
*
 0.272 (0.006)
*
 
ln(PerMktgBudgt) 0.233 (0.597)
n/s
 0.099 (0.091)
n/s
 
ln(ImpMktgBudgt) 0.315 (0.213)
n/s
 0.046 (0.032)
n/s
 
TSGi,t-1 -0.181 (0.005)
*
 0.008 (0.004)
**
 
ln(PerMktgBudgt) * ln(Gifti,t-1) 0.00004 (0.00005)
n/s
 0.00001 (0.000001)
*
 
ln(ImpMktgBudgt) * ln(Gifti,t-1) 0.00001 (0.00001)
n/s
 0.0001 (0.00001)
*
 
ln(PerMktgBudgt) * TSGi,t-1 0.044 (0.001)
*
 0.011 (0.001)
*
 
ln(ImpMktgBudgt) * TSGi,t-1 -0.048 (0.002)
*
 -0.022 (0.002)
*
 
Model Fit 
Log Pseudolikelihood -108,426.32 
            * Significant at p-value < 0.01; ** Significant at p-value < 0.05; n/s Not significant at p-value < 0.05 
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We also run the same analysis for the Donation Variety model (see Table 2.B3). Similar to 
the findings from Table 2.B2, we see that in Table 2.B3 the lag of Donation Variety, lag of 
Donation Amount, and the interaction between time since graduation and the instrumental 
variables are significant. Otherwise, we again see that the two instruments and their respective 
interactions with lag of donation amount are not significant in predicting Donation Variety. 
Again, this provides some empirical evidence that the instruments of Personal Marketing Budget 
and Impersonal Marketing Budget are good instruments for the Donation Variety model. 
 
 
TABLE 2.B3: Instrumental variables regressed on donation variety 
Variables (DV = Donation 
Variety) 
Selection 
Coeff. (Std. Err.) 
Main  
Coeff. (Std. Err.) 
Intercept -2.516 (0.056)
*
 0.660 (0.015)
*
 
ln(Varietyi,t-1) 3.060 (0.030)
*
 0.624 (0.010)
*
 
ln(Gifti,t-1) 0.001 (0.00001)
*
 0.005 (0.001)
*
 
ln(PerMktgBudgt) 0.403 (0.397)
n/s
 0.035 (0.036)
n/s
 
ln(ImpMktgBudgt) -0.370 (0.344)
n/s
 0.048 (0.083)
n/s
 
TSGi,t-1 0.231 (0.008)
*
 0.036 (0.002)
*
 
ln(PerMktgBudgt) * ln(Gifti,t-1) 0.00004 (0.00003)
n/s
 0.000001 (0.000001)
n/s
 
ln(ImpMktgBudgt) * ln(Gifti,t-1) -0.00006 (0.00005)
n/s
 0.000001 (0.000003)
n/s
 
ln(PerMktgBudgt) * TSGi,t-1 0.058 (0.002)
*
 0.004 (0.0004)
*
 
ln(ImpMktgBudgt) * TSGi,t-1 0.057 (0.003)
*
 0.003 (0.0007)
*
 
Model Fit 
Log Pseudolikelihood -26,090.89 
              * Significant at p-value < 0.01; ** Significant at p-value < 0.05; n/s Not significant at p-value < 0.05 
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APPENDIX 2.C: COMPARING DONATION VARIETY AND NUMBER OF 
INITIATIVES SUPPORTED 
 
We estimate the same model as shown in the main paper with one exception. We substitute 
Donation Variety with (1) cross-donation (CD) to represent to the number of initiatives 
supported and (2) log of the cumulative donation amount (ln(Gift_Cum)) to represent the depth 
of gift amounts. The results appear in Table 2.C1. 
TABLE 2.C1: Results for the donation variety and cross-donation models 
Variables 
Depth and Breadth Model 
(CDi,t-1 and ln(Gift_Cumi,t-1)) 
Donation Variety Model 
(Varietyi,t-1) 
Selection 
Coeff. (Std. Err.) 
Main  
Coeff. (Std. Err.) 
Selection 
Coeff.  
(Std. Err.) 
Main  
Coeff.  
(Std. Err.) 
Intercept 0.302 (0.027)n/s 2.157 (0.040)* -0.032 (0.025)n/s 2.412 (0.046)* 
ln(Gifti,t-1) 0.260 (0.004)
* 0.087 (0.004)* 0.204 (0.003)* 0.252 (0.005)* 
Varietyi,t-1 --- --- 0.071 (0.021)
* 0.157 (0.032)* 
CDi,t-1 0.030 (0.010)
* 0.057 (0.015)* --- --- 
ln(Gift_Cumi,t-1) 0.185 (0.005)
* 0.331 (0.008)* --- --- 
Extrinsic 
ImpMktgCostit 0.024 (0.008)
* 0.068 (0.15)* 0.044 (0.009)* 0.130 (0.020)* 
PerMktgCostit 0.002 (0.001)
** 0.025 (0.005)* 0.006 (0.002)* 0.032 (0.007)* 
Econt 2.075 (0.907)
** 0.835 (0.267)* 1.524 (0.377)* 4.753 (0.503)* 
Intrinsic 
Degreesit 0.017 (0.004)
* 0.081 (0.021)* 0.065 (0.013)* 0.087 (0.025)* 
Spousei 0.088 (0.015)
* 0.011 (0.022)* 0.093 (0.014)* 0.005 (0.027)n/s 
Interaction Effects 
Varietyi,t-1*ImpMktgCostit --- --- 0.043 (0.004)
* 0.003 (0.001)* 
Varietyi,t-1*PerMktgCostit --- --- 0.001 (0.0004)
** 0.002 (0.0005)* 
Varietyi,t-1*Econt --- --- -4.143 (0.774)
* -0.606 (0.101)* 
CDi,t-1*ImpMktgCostit 0.006 (0.002)
* 0.002 (0.001)** --- --- 
CDi,t-1*PerMktgCostit 0.0001 (0.00002)
* 0.0001 (0.00001)* --- --- 
CDi,t-1*Econt -1.323 (0.287)
* -0.244 (0.032)* --- --- 
ln(Gift_Cumi,t-
1)*ImpMktgCostit 
0.016 (0.001)* 0.007 (0.0009)* --- --- 
ln(Gift_Cumi,t-1)*PerMktgCostit 0.0002 (0.0001)
** 0.0001 (0.00004)** --- --- 
ln(Gift_Cumi,t-1)*Econt -0.004 (0.001)
* -0.593 (0.238)** --- --- 
Control Variables 
Genderi 0.078 (0.014)
* 0.360 (0.021)* 0.039 (0.013)* 0.439 (0.026)* 
Locationi 0.035 (0.014)
** 0.038 (0.012)* 0.054 (0.014)* 0.054 (0.025)** 
Time Since Graduationit -0.038 (0.002)
* 0.046 (0.003)* -0.071 (0.002)* 0.033 (0.003)* 
AvgAGIit 0.0004 (0.0001)
* 0.002 (0.0003)* 0.0002 (0.0001)** 0.003 (0.0003)* 
AvgGivingit 0.030 (0.014)
** 0.565 (0.390)n/s 0.064 (0.024)* 0.643 (0.259)** 
Control Function Variables 
ImpMktgErrori,t -0.069 (0.008)
* -0.108 (0.015)* -0.058 (0.009)* -0.146 (0.020)* 
PerMktgErrori,t 0.004 (0.001)
* -0.022 (0.005)* 0.009 (0.002)* -0.028 (0.007)* 
      * Significant at p-value < 0.01; ** Significant at p-value < 0.05; n/s Not significant at p-value < 0.05 
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The results of the model suggest that estimates for cross-donation (CD), log of the 
cumulative donation amount (ln(Gift_Cum)), and the interaction effects are all significant (just 
as the Donation Variety and interaction effects in the Proposed Model). This suggests that both 
sets of measures are capturing a similar effect (i.e. the key insights are the same). However, we 
do notice that the model fit (log pseudolikelihood) is better for the Donation Variety model. 
It is also important to see which model is able to better predict the expected donation amount 
both in-sample and out-of-sample. To test the in-sample model fit differences, we compare the 
MAD and MAPE of the expected donation value for all donors in all time periods in the 
observation window. We find the in-sample MAD (MAPE) for the Donation Variety model is 
$60.11 (17.27%) and for the cross-donation and total donation model is $70.97 (18.38%). This 
suggests that the model with a single measure of Donation Variety captures more of the variation 
in expected donation amounts than the model with separate variables representing the breadth 
and depth of donations (cross-donation and total donation). Next, we test the out-of-sample fit of 
the model. To do this, we used the coefficients from the models to select the ‘best’ donors based 
on the predicted expected donation in FY 2013, given the original observation window of the 
data is to the end of FY 2012. We then see if the university foundation is better off selecting the 
top percentiles of donors (10%, 15%, and 25%) based on expected donation from the Donation 
Variety or cross-donation and total donation models (see Table 2.C2). 
 
TABLE 2.C2: Donor selection using donation variety and cross-donation/total donation
a
 
Percent of Donors Selected in 
FY2013 
Donation Variety Cross-Donation (Breadth) and 
Total Donation (Depth) 
Top 10% of Donors $94.9k $88.9k 
Top 15% of Donors $104.2k $98.1k 
Top 25% of Donors $115.9k $110.0k 
                          a Total values are all rescaled by the same constant at the request of the focal university foundation 
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We see from Table 2.C2 that, whether the foundation selects the top 10%, 15%, or 25% of 
donors based on the expected giving amount predicted by the two different models, that the 
model using Donation Variety helps the university foundation select donors with higher giving 
amounts in FY 2013 by 6.7%, 6.2%, and 5.4% respectively. All of these results suggest that 
using the proposed measure of Donation Variety is more valuable than the traditional (and 
separate) measures of breadth (cross-donation) and depth (total donation), as Donation Variety is 
a single measure (rather than two independent measures) that captures both the breadth and 
distribution of depth of donations made to a nonprofit organization. 
 
 
 
 
